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Abstract 
 
Which social decisions are intuitive? Which are deliberative? The dual-process approach to 
human sociality has emerged in the last decades as a vibrant and exciting area of research. 
Here, I review the existing literature on the cognitive basis of cooperation, altruism, honesty, 
equity-efficiency, positive and negative reciprocity, and moral judgments. For each of these 
domains, I list a number of open problems that I believe to be crucial to further advance our 
understanding of human social cognition. I conclude by making an attempt to introduce a 
game-theoretical framework to organize the existing empirical evidence. This framework 
seems promising, as it turns out to make predictions that are generally in line with the 
experimental data in all but one domain: positive reciprocity. I tried to keep the review self-
contained, exhaustive, and research-oriented. My hope is that it can contribute to bring 
further attention to this fascinating area of research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1I wrote this review in occasion of a PhD course I was invited to give at the IMT School of Advanced Studies of 
Lucca, Italy. I would like to thank Ennio Bilancini for the invitation and all the participants at the course for the 
many helpful comments. I also would like to thank the Integrated Activity Project titled “Prosociality, 
Cognition, and Peer Effects” (PRO.CO.PE.), without which the course would have not been possible.  
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1. Introduction 
 
We humans are unique in the animal kingdom for our capacity to live in large societies made 
of thousands, if not millions, of unrelated individuals. Bees, ants, and the mole naked rat, for 
example, live in large societies, but individuals in the same society tend to share a substantial 
degree of biological relatedness. Other non-human primates live in groups of unrelated 
individuals, but these groups tend to be rather small. We are the only animals that are able to 
organize themselves in large societies. It has been argued that this uniquely-human capacity 
has been crucial for our evolutionary success as an animal species (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; 
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Hill, 2002; Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster & Hurtado, 2000; Tomasello, 
Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005).  
 
One obvious consequence of our living in large societies is that most of our decisions have 
consequences beyond our own: they affect other people or the society as a whole. Since the 
well-being of our societies highly depend on these social decisions, understanding how 
people make this type of decisions is a topic of great interest, that has attracted the attention 
of social scientists for decades. 
 
In the last twenty years, in particular, there has been an exponential increase in the number of 
studies exploring human sociality from the point of view of dual-process models. Dual-
process theories contend that people’s choices result from the interplay between two 
cognitive systems, one that is fast and intuitive, and one that is slow and deliberative. By 
applying a dual process lens to human sociality, scholars started asking themselves questions 
such as: Which social choices are intuitive? Which are deliberative? These questions turned 
out to be extremely fruitful and led to a series of exciting results, as for example, that people 
tend to intuitively reject harming someone else, even if this would be necessary to save a 
greater number of people (Greene et al, 2001; Greene et al, 2008), or that intuition favours 
cooperation over self-interest (Rand, 2016). These empirical findings were paralleled by the 
development of theoretical frameworks, most notably, the Social Heuristics Hypothesis 
(Rand et al., 2014). At the same time, however, a number of important problems remain 
unsolved, making this among the most thrilling and fascinating fields of research across 
behavioural sciences. 
 
I thus believe that the time is mature to present a review of the state of the art. The goal of 
this survey is threefold. First, I would like to introduce new researchers to a field that is 
growing exponentially and offers an incredible number of open questions. Having this in 
mind, I will try to keep this review as self-contained as possible. Second, I would like to 
conduct an exhaustive literature review, which I believe can be helpful for scholars that are 
already in the field. Third, I would like to describe a number of open problems that I think 
should be addressed in future research. Clearly, some of these problems will be more 
important than others. When possible, I will try to explain which questions in my opinion 
deserve more attention, and why.  
 
 
 
 
2. Preliminaries 
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2.1. Social decisions 
 
I start by defining the type of decisions that will be the focus of this review: social decisions. 
Broadly speaking, one might define social whatever decision affects people other than the 
decision maker. Clearly, this is a very general class of decisions and it is unlikely that, 
without further specifications, one could draw general conclusions regarding the cognitive 
foundations of all social decisions. In fact, social decisions can differ from one another along 
several dimensions. One important dimension regards the consequences that they bring about. 
What kind of consequences do these decisions have on other people? Good consequences or 
bad consequences? Right consequences or wrong consequences? Good consequences or right 
consequences? Another important dimension along which social decisions can differ from 
one another is whether the people affected by the decisions have, in turn, the possibility to 
affect the decision maker. If so, does this happen after, simultaneously, or before knowing the 
decision maker’s choice?  
 
For these reasons, it is useful to restrict the attention to particular subclasses of social 
decisions. In what follows, I list the type of decisions that have been studied in previous 
research, along with a short definition. More details about the way these decisions are 
measured will be postponed to the corresponding sections.  
 
 
 
 
2.1.1. Cooperation 
 
Two or more people have to simultaneously decide whether to pay a cost to increase the 
payoff of their group.  
 
 
 
 
2.1.2. Altruism 
 
One person has to decide whether to pay a cost to increase someone else’s payoff. This 
“someone else” could be a single person, or a group of people (e.g., charitable donation).  
 
 
 
 
2.1.3. Honesty 
 
A decision-maker has to decide whether to lie or to tell the truth. The decision-maker’s and 
someone else’s payoffs depend on whether the decision-maker lies or tell the truth. This 
“someone else” might be abstract (i.e., the experimenter) or concrete (i.e., another 
participant). Furthermore, the consequences of the lie could be positive or negative.  
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2.1.4. Equity-efficiency trade-off 
 
A person has to decide between two possible allocations of resources: one allocation 
minimizes the differences among the people involved in the interaction; the other allocation 
maximizes the sum of the payoff of the people involved in the interaction.  
 
 
 
 
2.1.5. Reciprocity 
 
After observing (or being the recipient of) an action, a decision-maker has to decide whether 
to pay a cost to punish or to reward the actor. Several types of reciprocity exist, depending on 
the details of the context. “Direct reciprocity” usually refers to situations in which the 
decision-maker was the recipient of the action (Trivers, 1971); conversely, “indirect 
reciprocity” usually refers to situations in which the decision-maker only observed the action, 
without being affected by it (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Additionally, one can distinguish 
between “positive reciprocity” and “negative reciprocity”, depending on whether the 
decision-maker has observed (or was the recipient of) a good action or a bad action.  
 
 
 
 
2.1.6. Deontology vs act utilitarianism 
 
A person has to decide whether to act so as to maximize the greater good, or to follow certain 
rules and norms, even if these lead to suboptimal outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
2.2. The dual-process approach 
 
Dual process theories refer to a set of frameworks unified by the basic idea that people’s 
choices result from the interplay between two cognitive systems, one that is fast and intuitive, 
and one that is slow and deliberative. This idea has been formalized in several different ways 
by different authors (Fodor, 1983, 2001; Scheider & Schiffrin, 1977; Epstein, 1994; Epstein 
& Pacini, 1999; Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Reber, 1993; Evans & Over, 1996; 
Evans, 1989, 2006; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Hammond, 1996; Stanovich, 
1999, 2004; Nisbett et al, 2001; Wilson, 2002; Lieberman, 2003; Toates, 2006; Strack & 
Deustch, 2004; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2011; Evans, 
2007), leading to a class of models that differ from each other in many details, not only in the 
names given to the two systems, but also in the specific functions that these systems are 
assumed to perform, to the point that these theories do not exactly map onto each other 
(Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Despite this, research agrees on the basic 
distinction between two systems: System 1 is fast, autonomous, and yields default responses; 
System 2 is slow, deliberative, and relies heavily on hypothetical thinking and working 
memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
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The dual-process approach to human sociality consists of a research program devoted to 
understanding under which conditions a given social decision turns out to be intuitive or 
deliberative. Making this classification is “fundamental for understanding human nature and, 
from a practical point of view, for designing institutions that encourage or discourage certain 
behaviors” (Krajabich et al, 2015). 
 
But how can we test whether a decision is intuitive or deliberative? Assume that a decision 
maker has to choose between Option A or Option B, and that we would like to test whether, 
for example, System 1 favors Option A over Option B. A first test we might think of doing is 
to look at reaction times: since System 1 is fast and System 2 is slow, one might expect that 
choosing Option A would take less time than choosing Option 2. This correlational test is, 
however, problematic, because any difference between response times might be driven by 
some other unobserved variable. For example, it has been recently noted that response time 
predicts decision conflict and choice discriminability, rather than deliberation, at least some 
contexts (Evans, Dillon & Rand, 2015; Krajbich, Bartling, Hare & Fehr, 2015; Evans & 
Rand, 2018). In general, all correlational tests suffer of the same statistical problem: any 
change in the dependent variable need not be driven by the independent variable under 
consideration, but it might be driven by other unobserved variables. For this reason, in this 
review I will be focus on causal tests, that is, on experimental manipulations of the cognitive 
system. Among these, the most used are: time constraints, cognitive load, conceptual primes, 
ego-depletion, neurostimulation.2  
 
Time constraints 
 
Since System 1 is fast and System 2 is slow, one obvious technique to promote the use of 
System 1 over System 2 is to ask participants to respond within a given window of time 
(“time pressure” condition). Conversely, to promote the use of System 2 over System 1 one 
can ask participants to stop and think for some time over the decision problem before making 
a decision (“time delay” condition).  
 
Although useful, time constraints have been criticized along several dimensions. The first 
criticism originates from the observation that time constraints need to be set in the decision 
screen and not in the instruction screen, because otherwise they would interfere with task 
comprehension. However, this methodological necessity implies that will-be-under-time-
pressure participants can actually stay as long as they want in the instruction screen, where 
they are free to start using System 2. Therefore, it is unclear whether the decision that then 
they make under time pressure can be considered their System 1 decision, or even correlated 
to it. The second limitation of studies using time pressure is that the length of the constraint, 
which is typically relatively long (5-10 seconds). If, on the one hand, relatively long time 
windows of time are needed for practical reasons (i.e., it requires a few seconds to inform 
participants that they now have to make a decision), this, on the other hand, implies that it is 
unclear whether decisions observed after 10 seconds can be considered System 1 decisions, 
                                               
2There have also been studies exploring the cognitive basis of sociality by comparing patients with brain lesions 
in areas typically associated to System 1 (e.g., the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) with healthy participants, 
and/or with patients with brain lesions in areas typically associated to System 2 (e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex). See Mendez et al. (2005), Ciaramelli et al. (2007); Koenigs et al. (2007), Koenigs & Tranel (2007), 
Wills et al. (2018), Zhu et al. (2014). Although I acknowledge the existence and the importance of these works, 
I have decided to keep them out of this review, because participants are not randomized between conditions (for 
obvious reasons) and therefore these studies do not allow to make causal inferences regarding the role of System 
1 and System 2 on social behaviour.  
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or even correlated to them, especially in light of the evidence that first decisions are made 
almost instantaneously, and sometimes even before people become aware of them (Libet, 
2009; Soon, Brass, Heinze & Haynes, 2008). The third limitation regards compliance rate in 
the time pressure condition. While it is possible to force participants to respond after a certain 
amount of time (for example, by letting the “submit” button in the decision screen appear 
only after 10 seconds), it is not possible to force participants to respond within a given 
amount of time. If the experimenter does not allow participants to submit their choice after a 
certain amount of time, there will be a selection bias; if the experimenter does allow 
participants to submit at any time, then there will be a proportion of participants who do not 
respect the time constraint. How should these participants be treated? In the earlier work by 
Rand et al (2012), these participants were eliminated from the analysis. However, critics have 
observed that this would create potentially dangerous selection bias (Bouwmeester et al, 
2017; Tinghög et al, 2013). More recently, experimenters have started including all 
participants in the analysis (Capraro, 2017; Rand, Newman & Wurzbacher, 2015; Tinghög et 
al, 2015). A third, more radical, solution is to have participants practice in a series of games, 
before the actual decision, so that they get used to respond quickly, and therefore minimize 
the proportion of participants who fail to comply to the time pressure (Everett et al., 2017). 
 
Cognitive load 
 
System 2 relies heavily on working memory, the cognitive system with a limited capacity that 
is responsible for storing short-term memory (Miyake & Shah, 1999). Therefore, one can 
inhibit the use of System 2 by having participants use their working memory to solve a 
parallel unrelated task that uses short-term memory (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Gilbert, Tafarodi 
& Malone, 1993), as, for example, memorizing a sequence of digits (Swann, Hixon, Stein-
Seroussi & Gilbert, 1990; Gilbert, Giesler & Morris, 1995; Trope & Alfieri, 1997; Shiv & 
Fedorikhin, 1999; Shiv & Nowlis, 2004), or hearing a series of letters while having to press a 
button whenever they hear a character that resounded two letters before (Gevins & Cutillo, 
1993; Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni & Utikal, 2014). The logic is that, since these are far from 
being simple tasks, then participants that are asked to perform these tasks will be less likely 
to use their working memory when making the parallel decision. For example, Gilbert & 
Hixon (1991) found that that cognitively loaded participants rely on a greater extent on 
stereotypes; Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999) found that cognitively loaded participants exert less 
self-control when choosing between cake and fruit salad; Hinson, Jameson and Whitney 
(2003) found that cognitively loaded participants have greater discounting of future rewards.  
 
Cognitive load studies too have several limitations. The first one is that it is possible that the 
task being used to impair participants’ access to working memory interacts with the decision 
problem. The second one is the conceptual mirror image of the analogous limitation of time 
constraint studies: typically, a number of participants fail to correctly perform the parallel 
task needed to impair their working memory; how should these participants be treated? 
Similar to time constraint studies, to avoid selection bias, experimenters typically include all 
participants in the analysis. The third limitation is that cognitive load manipulations can be 
used only to undermine the used System 2, and never to promote it.  
 
Conceptual priming 
 
Another technique to promote the use of System 1 or System 2 takes the name of conceptual 
priming. The idea is simple: before making a choice, participants complete an exercise that 
prime them to rely either on System 1 or on System 2. The priming can be done in several 
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different ways, for example by asking participants to use their intuition or deliberation (Liu & 
Hao, 2011), or by having participant write a piece of text in which they describe a time in 
their life in which following their gut reactions (or thinking carefully) led them to good 
decision making (Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodden, 2013; Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012; 
Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), or by having participants read a piece of text talking 
positively about intuitive (or deliberative) decision making (Capraro, Everett & Earp, 2019; 
Levine, Barasch., Rand, Berman & Small, 2018). 
 
The main limitation of conceptual prime studies is that they are transparent in their purpose, 
because they explicitly mention the words “intuition”, “deliberation”, etc. This may create 
demand effects such that participants make a decision according to what they believe the 
intuitive or the deliberative choice should be (Rand, 2016; Kvarven et al., 2019). A potential 
solution to this limitation would be to use subtler primes, as those used by Small, 
Loewenstein and Sloviv (2007). To the best of my knowledge these primes have never been 
applied to social decisions of the type considered in the current review. 
 
There exist also other techniques to prime people to deliberate. One is having participants 
speak in a foreign language. Indeed, the native language is intuitive and automatic, while 
foreign languages tend to be processed more slowly. This suggests that letting participants 
make a decision in a foreign language would promote the use of System 2. According to this 
view, foreign language has been shown to reduce heuristics and biases (Costa et al., 2014a; 
Keysar et al., 2012; Costa, Vives & Corey, 2017; Hakayawa, Costa, Foucart & Keysar, 2016) 
and to reduce emotionally-driven responses in moral dilemmas (Cipolletti, McFarlane & 
Weissglass, 2016; Corey et al., 2017; Costa et al., 2014b, Geipel, Hadjichristidis & Surlan, 
2015; Hayakawa, Tannenbaum, Costa, Corey & Keysar, 2017). These studies too have their 
own limitations, however, the major of which is that reasoning in a second language is 
typically cognitively tiring and this might contribute to depletion of cognitive resources that 
work in the opposite direction of the prime (Volk, Köhler & Pudelko, 2014). 
 
Ego depletion 
 
Ego depletion is an experimental technique based on the theoretical assumption that System 2 
requires the exert of self-control to override immediate temptations. Although there is an 
ongoing debate about whether self-control is a limited resource (Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996; Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994; Baumeister & Tierney, 2011; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000) or not (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht, Schmeichel & Macrae, 
2014), there is abundant empirical evidence showing that exerting self-control at Time 1 
reduces the ability to exert self-control at Time 2. Following this line of work, several 
scholars have explored how participants make social decisions after having completed a task 
meant to undermine their self-control.  
 
Self-control can be impaired in several ways, for example using the Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935), or the e-hunting task (Moller, Deci & Ryan, 2006). Other empirical techniques that are 
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typically used to decrease self-control are sleep deprivation3, hunger4, and alcohol 
intoxication5, and mortality salience6. 
 
Ego depletion studies too have their limitations. Probably the main limitation is that recent 
meta-analyses have challenged the very existence of ego-depletion. By correcting for 
publication bias, some meta-analyses have concluded that the ego-depletion effect may not be 
different from zero (Carter, Kofler, Forster & McCullough, 2015; Carter & McCullough, 
2014; Hagger et al, 2016). However, also these meta-analyses have their limitations. 
Consequently, whether ego-depletion is a real or an illusory effect is still under debate 
(Friese, Loschelder, Gieseler, Frankenbach & Inzlicht, 2019). A second limitation, similar to 
one of the limitations of cognitive load studies, is that ego-depletion tasks can be used to 
impair System 2, but there is no symmetric equivalent to impair System 1.  
 
Neurostimulation 
 
Neurostimulation is an empirical technique based on research in neuroscience suggesting that 
a particular area of the brain, the right lateral prefrontal cortex (rLPFC), and, more 
specifically, its subarea, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC), are implicated in 
working memory, planning, abstract reasoning, and self-restraint (Hare et al, 2009; 
Hutcherson et al, 2012; Barbey et al, 2013; Zhu et al, 2014). Crucially, this area, being 
relatively superficial, can be activated or disactivated using non-invasive electric or magnetic 
stimulation tools. These tools thus provide a useful way to explore the causal link between 
cognitive process and social decisions. There are two such tools. The tDCS (Transcranial 
Direct Current Stimulation) stimulates the target region of the brain by applying a small 
electrical direct current directly to the scalp; the TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation) 
uses magnetic fields to stimulate nerve cells in the target region of the brain. 
 
The main limitation of these techniques is that, being non-invasive, it is difficult to target 
exactly the region of interested. For example, de Berker, Bikson and Bestmann (2013) 
criticizes tDCS because the anode is typically placed over the region of interest, and this 
implicitly assumes that the current spreads uniformly from the anode to the target area. 
However, this is generally not true, but dramatically depends on the topography of the 
cortical surface, which, in some cases, can even reverse the polarity of the current (Rahman 
et al., 2013). Similarly, TMS has been criticized because it is unclear how its effects 
propagate in other areas of the brain. To be more precise, the underlying mechanism of TMS 
is to induce random noise into usually ordered neural processes. However, “if a group of 
                                               
3While some authors have originally argued that sleep deprivation and ego depletion are different (Vohs, Glass, 
Maddox & Markman, 2011), a more recent review found a positive effect of sleep deprivation on aggression, a 
behaviour typically driven by lack of self-control (Kamphuis, Meerlo, Koolhaas & Lancel, 2012). 
4It is worth mentioning the classic study by Danziger, Levav and Avnaim-Pesso (2011), who found that judges’ 
favourable rulings drop from nearly 65% to nearly 0 from the morning to lunch time, and then again from after 
lunch time to dinner time. 
5Alcohol intoxication is known to diminish the executive cognitive functions necessary for effortful and 
controlled processing (Moskowitz, Burns & Williams, 1985; Fillmore, Carscadden & Vogel-Sprott, 1998; 
Curtin & Fairchild, 2003). 
6Mortality salience is a cognitive manipulation based on Terror Management Theory (Becker, 1973; Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986). According to this theory, in order to avoid the anxiety provoked by death-
related thoughts, people suppress thoughts of death by relying on their cognitive resources. Therefore, 
reminding people about their mortality has the effect of depleting their cognitive resources. Several studies 
supported this view (see, e.g., Arnds, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Simon, 1997). However, mortality 
salience also has been recently criticized, as a pre-registered replication of the original study failed to find an 
effect (Sætrevik & Sjåstad, 2019).  
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neurons are involved in a given task, introducing a TMS pulse is highly unlikely to 
selectively stimulate the same coordinated pattern of neural activity as performance of that 
task” (Walsh & Cowey, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Random but useful preliminary notions 
 
2.3.1. The Cognitive Reflection Test 
 
The cognitive reflection test (CRT), originally developed by Frederick (2005), is a set of 
questions, each of which is characterized by the property that an immediate but wrong answer 
typically pops up to the reader’s mind; to find the correct answer, one needs to override this 
intuitive but wrong response. The classic CRT is made of three questions. A typical item 
reads as follows: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. If the bat costs $1 more than the ball, 
how much does the ball cost? The typical reader would be tempted to respond that the ball 
costs $0.10. However, a moment of reflection shows that, since the bat costs $1 more than the 
ball, then, if the ball costed $0.10, then the bat would cost $1.10, which would imply that the 
cost of the bat and the ball together would be $1.20, and not $1.10 as assumed. For this 
reason, the score in the CRT is usually taken as a measure of deliberation. In support of this 
interpretation, Pennycook, Cheyne, Kohler and Fugelsang (2016) have shown that CRT 
scores correlate with Need for Cognition7. However, interestingly, it is not clear whether the 
number of intuitive answers can be taken as a measure of intuition, because this number does 
not seem to correlate with Faith on Intuition8 (Pennycook, Cheyne, Kohler & Fugelsang, 
2016). Another criticism of the CRT is that it requires numerical abilities, and this ultimately 
generates gender differences in CRT scores. In order to avoid this issue, Thomson and 
Oppenheimer (2016) have proposed a new version of the CRT in which the use of numerical 
abilities is reduced. A typical question in this test is: Emily’s father has three daughters. The 
first two are named April and May. What is the third daughter’s name? (intuitive answer: 
June; correct answer: Emily). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2. The Social Value Orientation 
 
The Social Value Orientation (SVO) of an individual corresponds to the weight a person 
poses on the payoff of other individuals in relation to its own (Messick and McClintock, 
1968). The basic idea is to represent the utility function of one individual as a combination 
between the material payoff of that individual and the material payoff of another individual: 
 
U(ps,po) = wsps + wopo, 
 
                                               
7The Need for Cognition is a scale introduced by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) to measure the extent to which a 
person is inclined towards effortful cognitive activities.  
8The Faith in Intuition is a scale introduce by Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier (1996) to measure the extent 
to which a person is inclined towards effortless, intuitive, activities. 
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where ps is the material payoff of the self, po is the payoff of the other, ws is the weight that 
one individual places on its own payoff, and wo is the weight that the same individual places 
on the other’s payoff. An individual with ws = 1 and  wo = 0 is perfectly individualist (or self-
regarding), because it cares only about its own payoff; an individual with ws = 0 and  wo = 1 
is perfectly altruistic because it cares only about the other’s payoff; an individual with ws = -1 
and  wo = 0 is perfectly masochist, because it only cares about damaging itself;  an individual 
with ws = 0 and  wo = -1 is perfectly sadist, because it only cares about damaging the other 
person; an individual with ws = wo is perfectly cooperative, because it only cares about the 
sum of the payoffs.  
 
Clearly one can normalize ws and wo in such a way that ws2 + wo2 = 1. This leads to a simple 
and useful geometric representation of the SVO, as the angle q such that ws = cos(q) and wo 
= sin(q) (Griesinger and Livingston, 1973). In this way, one can represent all possible SVOs 
as angles of a ring in the own-payoff/other-payoff plane, which in turn leads to what is 
known as “the ring measure” of the SVO (Liebrand, 1984). According to this work, one can 
compute that the SVO of a participant by having the participant play a series of 24 mini-
dictator games. The payoffs corresponding to the dictator and the recipient correspond to 
equally spaced points on the ring. By adding up all the resulting vectors, one can compute a 
single vector, whose angle represents the SVO of the individual. Individuals with a vector 
falling between 22.5° and 112.5° are classified as pro-socials; those with a vector falling 
between 292.5° (or -67.5°) and 22.5° are classified as pro-selves. The SVO has been shown 
to predict cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, Parks & Joireman, 2009) and charitable 
giving (Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt & Van Vugt, 2007).9  
 
Another measure of the SVO, that is receiving considerable attention, has been introduced 
more recently by Murphy, Ackermann and Handgraaf (2011). This is a set of 6 mini-dictator 
games in which the decision maker has to decide how to allocate money between 
herself/himself and the recipient. Then one computes the mean allocation for self As and the 
mean allocation for other Ao; then one subtracts 50 from each of these values. Finally, one 
defines SVO° to be the arctan of (Ao – 50) / (As – 50). This SVO angle is different from the 
one introduced by Liebrand (1984). Indeed, possible values for this angle spans from -16.26° 
(for a perfect competitor) to 61.39° (for a perfect altruist). Negative values correspond to 
competitors, an angle of 0° correspond to a perfect individualist; an angle of 45° corresponds 
to giving equal weights to own and others’ outcomes. An angle of 22.45° is usually taken as 
threshold for separating individual orientations from prosocial orientations.  
 
 
 
 
2.3.3. Some basic notions in Game Theory 
 
In Section 9, I will make an attempt to introduce a formal game-theoretical framework to 
organize the empirical evidence that I am going to review in Sections 3-9. This framework is 
not terribly complicated, but it anyway requires some basic notions in Game Theory. Since 
one of my aims is to keep this review self-contained, in this section I will review the notions 
                                               
9It is worth noting that the subdivision of participants in pro-socials and pro-selves according to their SVO 
implies that most studies looking at the cognitive underpinnings of the SVO confound altruistic behaviour 
(helping others) with cooperative behaviour (helping the group). In this review I will mainly focus on studies 
that remove this confound (e.g., Capraro et al, 2017). 
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that are needed to develop the framework in Section 9. These notions will be used only in 
Section 9. Therefore, a reader who, at this moment, is not yet interested in the theoretical 
framework, can skip this section without affecting the reading of the following sections. 
 
The first notion that I need for the theoretical model is the very notion of a game. Intuitively 
speaking, a game formalizes whatever situation in which there is a number of people who 
interact among each other, by making choices, and where the payoff of each player depends 
on the configuration of the choices made by each player. More formally, a finite game in 
normal form G is given by: 
 
• A set of players P = {1, …, n}, 
• For each player i, a finite strategy set Si, 
• For each player i, a payoff function ui from S = S1 x … x Sn to the real numbers. 
 
Note that Si can contain only one element, in which case player i is not actually choosing 
among multiple choices. This is useful to represent situations in which one player is affected 
by other players’ decisions, but it actually makes no active decisions (e.g., the dictator game, 
see Section 4.1). Elements of S are called “strategy profiles”. Given a strategy profile s = (s1, 
…, sn) Î S, as usual, I will use the notation s = (si, s-i) when I will need to highlight the 
strategy played by player i versus the strategy profile played by the other players.  
 
A Nash equilibrium of G is any strategy profile (s1, …, sn) Î S such that, for all i Î P, one 
has: 
 
• ui(si, s-i) ³ ui(ti, s-i), for all ti Î Si 
 
Intuitively speaking, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy choice for each player such that no 
player has an incentive to change strategy. 
 
By the classical Nash theorem, every finite game has a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). 
 
Another basic notion that will be used in Section 9 is that of discounted payoffs, which, in 
turn, is useful to define the payoff of an infinitely repeated game. Indeed, finitely repeated 
games create no definitional problems, as one can define the payoff at round T simply as the 
sum of the payoffs until round T. This definition, however, becomes problematic in infinitely 
repeated games, as it may not converge to a finite number. There are several ways to avoid 
this technical difficulty. A popular one, especially used in situations in which there is reason 
to assume that future payoffs count less than present payoffs, is by discounting future payoffs 
by a factor q. More formally, the payoff of player i at round T is defined as:  
 𝑈" =$ q%𝑢"'%()  
 
 
 
 
3. The cognitive underpinnings of cooperation 
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Probably, the most important form of social behavior is cooperation. Many scholars have 
come to argue that the uniquely-human capacity to cooperate with unrelated others has been 
the secret of their enormous evolutionary success as an animal species (Ostrom, 2000; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Milinski, Semman & Krambeck, 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & Fehr, 2003; 
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Nowak, 2006; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Rand & Nowak, 2013; 
Perc et al, 2017); along these lines, research in psychology has suggested that psychological 
basis of cooperation, shared intentionality, is what makes humans uniquely humans, as it is 
possessed by children, but not by great apes (Tomasello et al., 2005).  
 
 
 
 
3.1. Measures of cooperation 
 
Cooperation can be operationally defined in several different ways. Here, I follow the 
literature on social dilemmas. A social dilemma is any situation in which there is a conflict 
between individual interest and group interest (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968; Dawes, 1980; 
Kollock, 1988; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Nowak, 2006; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Capraro, 
2013; Perc et al, 2017). The main social dilemmas considered in the literature are the 
prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game.  
 
 
 
 
3.1.1. The prisoner’s dilemma 
 
In its broadest generality, the prisoner’s dilemma is the following two-player, simultaneous-
move, symmetric, game. 
 
Two players have to choose between cooperation and defection. Mutual cooperation gives, as 
a payoff, the reward for cooperation R. Mutual defection gives, as a payoff, the punishment 
P. Unilateral cooperation gives, to the cooperator, the sucker’s payoff S and, to the defector, 
the temptation payoff T. Payoffs satisfy the inequalities T > R > P > S. 
 
Therefore, players would be better off if they both cooperate than if they both defect. 
However, unilateral defection leads to the highest individual payoffs. This leads to the 
conflict between individual payoff and group payoff that is at the core of the social dilemma. 
 
A particular version of the prisoner’s dilemma, often used by biologists, is the following: 
cooperation means paying a cost c to give a benefit b > c to the other person; defection 
means doing nothing. This corresponds to a prisoner’s dilemma with T = b, R = b – c, P = 0, 
S = – c.   
 
The classical prisoner’s dilemma game is symmetric (i.e., the values T, R, P, S do not depend 
on the players). However, some scholars have also studied the cognitive basis of cooperation 
in asymmetric games (e.g., Lotz, 2015). Asymmetric social dilemmas are very important in 
light of practical applications, because in reality there is often power imbalance among 
people. This unequal distribution of power can be formalized in terms of asymmetries among 
players between costs and benefits of cooperation. 
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3.1.2. The public goods game 
 
In its broadest generality, the public goods game is the following N-player, simultaneous-
move, symmetric, game: 
 
N players are initially given an endowment e. Each player has to choose how much of it, if 
any, to contribute to a public pool. Let ci be player i’s contribution. The payoff of player i is 
defined as pi(c1,…cN) = e – ci + m(c1 + … + cN), where m is a constant, named marginal 
return for cooperation, which is assumed to be strictly greater than 0 and strictly smaller than 
1. 
 
The fact that m Î (0,1) implies that, as in the prisoner’s dilemma, players would be better off 
if they all cooperate, compared to when they all defect; however, each individual is better off 
when s/he defects, independently of the other players’ strategies. Therefore, also in this case 
there is a conflict between individual payoff and group payoff, which is at the core of the 
social dilemma. In this case too, one can easily define an asymmetric variant of the game, in 
order to take into account potential power imbalances among players. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Other social dilemmas 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game are not the only games for which there is 
a conflict between individual payoff and group payoff. Other examples are the traveller’s 
dilemma (Basu, 1994) and the Bertrand competition. However, to the best of my knowledge, 
no one has explored the cognitive underpinnings of cooperation in these social dilemmas.10 
Therefore, in this review, I will not consider these games. Somewhat related, some scholars 
have instead looked at the effect of intuition and deliberation on the Stag-Hunt game (Belloc 
et al., 2018). In this game there is conflict between a strategy that is risk-dominant and one 
that is efficient; however, both these strategies are Nash equilibria, and therefore, in the Stag-
Hunt game, the conflict between individual and group interest that is at the core of the 
dilemma of cooperation is not present. Therefore, although interesting, I will not consider this 
work in this review. One more reason to not include the Stag-Hunt game in this review is that 
there is indeed only one study looking at the effect of intuition and deliberation on this game 
(Belloc et al., 2018). I think it will be important to conduct more studies, in order to better 
understand the cognitive basis of the conflict between safety and efficiency that is at the core 
of the Stag-Hunt dilemma. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.4. Other definitions of cooperation 
 
                                               
10There is some work looking at the correlation between response time and cooperation in the traveler’s 
dilemma (Rubinstein, 2007; Santa, Exadaktylos, & Soto-Faraco, 2018), but no studies exploring the causal link 
that I am aware of.  
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As I mentioned above, there are other ways to define cooperative behaviour. Of particular 
interest, for the current review, is the distinction between pure cooperation and strategic 
cooperation proposed by Rand (2016). Rand referred to pure cooperation when: (i) a player 
pays a cost to give a benefit to one or more other players; (ii) the payoff maximizing strategy 
in the long term is different from the payoff maximizing strategy in one-shot, anonymous, 
interactions. One can easily see that the prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game (as 
well as the traveler’s dilemma and the Bertrand competition) verify these two properties. But 
these are not the only ones. Consider the Trust Game. Here, Player 1 is given a certain 
amount of money and has to decide how much of it, if any, to invest. The amount invested is 
multiplied by a factor greater than 1 and given to Player 2. Then Player 2 decides how much 
of the amount s/he received to return to Player 1. Clearly, in one-shot anonymous 
interactions, Player 2 has no incentive to return any money, and therefore Player 2’s payoff-
maximizing strategy in one-shot anonymous interactions is to keep the whole amount. 
However, in repeated interactions it might be optimal for Player 2 to return part of the money 
in order to avoid that Player 1 in the next round does not invest any money, leading to a long-
term loss for Player 2. Therefore, the Trust Game (played in the role of Player 2) is an 
example of pure cooperation in the sense of Rand (2016).  
 
On the other hand, according to Rand (2016), strategic cooperation refers to those 
interactions in which one player has to decide whether to pay a cost to give a benefit to 
another player; however, whether this choice maximizes the player’s payoff depends on the 
decision of the other player. The two cases considered in Rand (2016) are the one-shot, 
anonymous, Trust Game (player 1) and the one-shot, anonymous, ultimatum game (player 1). 
Indeed, in the one-shot, anonymous, Trust game, whether investing money maximizes Player 
1’s payoff depends on the behaviour of Player 2: if Player 2 returns a sufficient amount of 
money, then for Player 1 it is optimal to invest; otherwise, it is not. In the ultimatum game, 
instead, Player 1 has to decide how to split a certain sum of money and Player 2 has to decide 
whether to accept or reject the proposed split. In case Player 2 accepts the offer, then the two 
players are paid according to the agreed split; in case Player 2 rejects the offer, both players 
end up with nothing. Therefore, Player 1 can make a larger offer, but this choice will be 
optimal only if Player 1 believes that Player 2 will accept the corresponding offer and will 
reject any smaller offer. Other cases of strategic cooperation are the repeated public Goods 
game and the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
 
 
3.2. Review of the empirical evidence 
 
A number of empirical studies have explored the causal link between cognitive process and 
cooperation, especially using time constraints. The seminal work by Rand, Greene & Nowak 
(2012) showed that time pressure increases cooperation relative to time delay in the public 
goods game. Rand et al (2014) subsequently replicated this result with a greater sample. 
Additionally, they found that the effect was driven by inexperienced participants. This 
observation led to the so-called Social Heuristics Hypothesis (see next section for further 
details). The positive effect of time pressure on cooperation was replicated also in the context 
of competitively framed public goods games (Cone & Rand, 2014) and in the context of 
public goods games played with out-group members (Rand, Newman & Wurzbacher, 2015). 
However, the methodology followed by Rand et al (2012) and Rand et al (2014) has been 
criticized, because it excluded from the analysis participants who failed to comply to the time 
constraints, leading to potential selection bias. Specifically, Tinghög et al (2013) conducted 
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five studies and, without excluding participants who fail to respond within the given time 
constraints, they found no overall effect of time pressure on cooperation. As a consequence, 
they advanced the hypothesis that the earlier results of Rand et al. (2012) were driven by 
selection bias. Along these lines, Bouwmeester et al. (2017) conducted a preregistered 
replication of Study 7 in Rand et al. (2012), which includes 21 studies. They replicated the 
effect that time pressure increases cooperation, but only when participants who fail to comply 
with the time constraint are excluded from the analysis; they concluded that the positive 
effect of time pressure on cooperation is best explained in terms of selection bias. Consistent 
with this view, Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2014) and Strømland, Tjotta and Torsvik (2016) 
too found no overall effect of time pressure on cooperation. More recently, however, Everett, 
Ingbretsen, Cushman and Cikara (2017) made an important step in the direction of 
eliminating the methodological limitations of time pressure studies. Everett et al. (2017) used 
a prisoner’s dilemma preceded by an extensive warm-up. In this way, Everett et al. (2017) 
were able to reduce non-compliance to time pressure from about 50% in Rand et al. (2012) to 
just 2%. In doing so, they confirmed the result by Rand and colleagues that time pressure has 
a positive effect on cooperation. Moreover, they replicated the result that time pressure 
increases cooperation even when playing versus an out-group member. Additionally, they 
also found that the same effect is present in the prisoner’s dilemma played in a loss frame. A 
similar warm-up procedure was followed by Isler, Maule and Starmer (2018), who also found 
that time pressure increases cooperation. In contrast to this line of research, however, there 
have also been two studies finding a negative effect of time pressure on cooperation: Capraro 
& Cococcioni (2016) found that extreme time pressure leads to less cooperation; Goeschl and 
Lohse (2018) found that time pressure leads to more free-riding in the one-shot public goods 
game. However, the former work had the limitation that time constraints were added in the 
instruction screen, and this might have interacted with participants’ level of comprehension; 
whereas the latter work had very high non-compliance rate (43%). 
Some works have explored the role of potential moderators. Rand and Kraft-Todd (2014) 
found that time pressure increases cooperation in a public goods game, but only among 
participants who are both inexperienced and have high trust on people whom they are interact 
with in their everyday life; symmetrically, Capraro and Cococcioni (2015) found that time 
pressure does not affect cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma played in India, where the rate 
of cooperation is much lower than a similar experiment conducted in the US. These papers 
were interpreted as supporting the evidence that time pressure makes people more likely to 
use cooperative heuristics learned in their everyday interaction. Another work investigated 
the cognitive foundations of cooperation as a function of participants’ SVO. Specifically, 
Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani (2018) implemented an incentive compatible time constraint 
(participants under time delay are paid €1 if they respond after 10 seconds; participants under 
time pressure loses 30 cents for every second spent on the decision screen). In doing so, they 
found no overall effect of time pressure on cooperation in a one-shot public goods game; 
however, they found that time constraints interacted with SVO, in such a way that time 
pressure made prosocials become more prosocials, left individualists unaffected, and made 
competitors become more competitive. They replicated this result also in a repeated PGG 
with random re-matching and no feedback. They concluded that intuition enhances intrinsic 
predispositions. Bird et al. (2019) explored the moderating effect of risk aversion in a sample 
of men. In doing so, they found that time pressure increases honesty, but only among low risk 
men, while the effect even reverses among high risk men, who become less cooperative 
under time pressure. 
 
A handful of papers have explored the effect of conceptual priming of intuition and 
deliberation on cooperation. Rand et al (2012) found that priming intuition favours 
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cooperation, compared to priming of deliberation. Lotz (2015) replicated this result using 
asymmetric prisoner’s dilemmas. Levine et al (2018) replicated this finding using a 
conceptual priming of emotion versus reason. However, Camerer et al (2018) failed to 
replicate the original study in Rand et al (2012). Urbig, Terjesen, Procher, Muehlfeld and van 
Witteloostuijn (2016) found that Dutch participants cooperate less in a public goods game 
when the instructions are presented in English than when they are presented in their mother 
tongue. However, Gargalianou, Urbig and Witteloostuijn (2017) found no effect of thinking 
in a second-language on cooperation in an iterated public goods game with no feedback.  
 
As for ego-depletion, Capraro and Cococcioni (2016) found that depleting participants’ self-
control with three tasks (Stroop task, e-hunting task, and give-the-wrong-answer task) 
impairs cooperative behaviour in a prisoner’s dilemma, but only among participants with no 
previous experience about the game, while it has no effect on experienced participants. 
Rantapuska et al (2017) found that hunger does not affect cooperation in a public goods 
game; along the same lines Clark and Dickinson (2017) found that sleep restriction does not 
affect contributions to the public goods game. None of these latter two studies controlled for 
participants’ level of experience in the game. 
 
Finally, I am aware of only one study using neurostimulation techniques to explore the 
cognitive basis of cooperation. Li et al. (2018) used an iterated asymmetric public goods 
game with no feedback after each iteration. They used transcranial direct current stimulation 
to stimulate versus reduce the rDLPFC. In doing so, Li et al (2018) found that all participants, 
regardless of their (asymmetric) starting endowment, cooperate more when the rDLPFC is 
activated than when it is inhibited. The baseline, “sham”, condition sits in the middle. 
 
 
 
Cooperation 
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Rand et al. (2012) Public goods game Pressure increases cooperation, compared to 
Delay 
Tinghög et al. (2013) – Study 1-4 Prisoner’s dilemma No effect of Pressure vs Delay on cooperation 
Tinghög et al. (2013) – Study 5 Public Goods game with 
binary choices 
No effect of Pressure vs Delay on cooperation 
Cone & Rand (2014) Public goods game with 
a competitive frame 
Pressure increases cooperation, compared to 
Delay 
Rand et al. (2014) Public goods game Pressure increases cooperation, compared to 
Delay, but only among inexperienced 
participants 
Rand & Kraft-Todd (2014) Public goods game  Pressure increases cooperation, but only among 
participants that are naïve and trusting 
Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester 
(2014) 
Public goods game No effect of Pressure vs Delay on cooperation 
Capraro & Cococcioni (2015) Prisoner’s dilemma No effect of Pressure vs Delay on cooperation 
Rand et al. (2015)  Public goods game 
played with out-group 
members 
Pressure increases cooperation, compared to 
Delay 
Capraro & Cococcioni (2016) Prisoner’s dilemma Pressure decreases cooperation 
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Strømland et al (2016) Public Goods Game Pressure has no effect on cooperation, compared 
to Delay 
Bouwmeester et al. (2017) 21 preregistered public 
goods game 
No effect of Pressure vs Delay on the whole 
sample. Pressure increases cooperation, among 
participants who respect the time constraint 
Everett et al. (2017)  Prisoner’s dilemma Pressure increases cooperation, compared to 
delay, also towards competitive out-groups 
Goeschl & Lohse (2018) Public goods game Pressure decreases cooperation 
Alós-Ferrer & Garagnani (2018) Public goods game Pressure increases cooperation among prosocial 
participants; Pressure has no effect on 
individualist participants; Pressure decreases 
cooperation among competitive participants 
Bird et al. (2019) Public Goods Game 
among males 
Pressure increases cooperation among low risk 
males; Pressure decreases cooperation among 
high risk males 
Conceptual prime studies   
Rand et al. (2012) Public goods game Intuition increases cooperation, compared to 
Deliberation 
Lotz (2015) Asymmetric prisoner’s 
dilemma 
Intuition increases cooperation, compared to 
Deliberation 
Urbig et al. (2016)  Public goods game Second language decreases cooperation, 
compared to mother tongue 
Gargalianou et al. (2017) Public goods game No effect of second language on cooperation, 
compared to mother tongue 
Levine et al. (2018) Prisoner’s dilemma Emotion increases cooperation, compared to 
Reason 
Camerer et al. (2018) Public Goods game No effect of Intuition vs Deliberation 
Ego depletion studies   
Capraro & Cococcioni (2016) Prisoner’s dilemma Ego depletion decreases cooperation 
Clark & Dickinson (2017) Public goods game No effect of sleep restriction on cooperation 
Rantapuska et al. (2017) Public goods game No effect of hunger on cooperation 
Neurostimulation studies   
Li et al. (2018) Asymmetric public 
goods game 
Positive activation of rDLPFC increases 
cooperation, compared to “sham” baseline; 
negative activation of rDLPFC decreases 
cooperation, relative to sham 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Pure vs Strategic cooperation and the Social Heuristics Hypothesis 
 
As reviewed above, the evidence about the effect of cognitive process on cooperation in one-
shot, anonymous, social dilemmas is quite mixed. To shed light on this question, Rand (2016) 
turned to meta-analytic techniques. He meta-analysed 67 studies in which cognitive process 
was manipulated in situations involving pure cooperation, that is, he included in his meta-
analysis, also studies using the Trust game (only player 2), and those using finitely repeated 
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games (only last round). In doing so, he reported an overall positive effect of intuition on 
cooperation. Interestingly, this positive effect was not present in strategic cooperation. He 
used this result to support the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH). The SHH (Rand et al, 
2012; Rand et al, 2014; Bear & Rand, 2016) contends that people internalize strategies that 
are optimal in everyday interactions, which are typically repeated, and use them as default 
strategies in novel settings, when their capacity to deliberate is impaired. Then, after 
deliberation, people override these social heuristics and tailor their behaviour towards the one 
that is optimal in the given interaction. Therefore, the SHH predicts that intuition favours 
pure but not strategic cooperation, which is exactly what Rand’s (2016) meta-analysis shows. 
This overall conclusion was recently challenged by Kvarven et al. (2019), who conducted an 
updated meta-analysis (82 experiments). In their meta-analysis, Kvarven et al. (2019) 
included only social dilemmas, that is, they did not include the Trust game and the sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma. In doing so, they replicated the overall effect of intuition on cooperation, 
but found that this effect was entirely driven by conceptual primes explicitly asking people to 
rely on their emotion, which may have induced demand effect. In a response paper, Rand 
(2019) argued that there is no theoretical reason to exclude the Trust game and the sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma from the analysis. Adding these games, Rand (2019) found an positive 
effect of intuition on pure cooperation, which remains significant also when restricting the 
analysis to studies which do not use the explicit primes. 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Outlook and open problems 
 
In this section, I shortly summarize the previous findings and I list a set of open problems 
that I think deserve the attention of future research. These questions are not listed in order of 
importance; moreover, the list is not meant to be exhaustive. This field of research is full of 
fascinating questions, and many others might come up in the future after new findings 
become known. 
 
As described above, the evidence regarding a potential causal link between cognitive process 
and cooperation is quite mixed. Rand’s (2016) meta-analysis sheds light on the topic by 
providing support for the hypothesis that, overall, System 1 is related to cooperative 
behaviour, while System 2 is related to non-cooperative behaviour. However, this conclusion 
was challenged by a larger meta-analysis, with different inclusion criteria (Kvarven et al., 
2019), which, on turn, was challenged by an even larger meta-analysis (Rand, 2019). The 
overall conclusion that one can draw from this debate is that there is a need for more studies. 
 
Regarding strengthening the causal link between System 1 and cooperation, I note that most 
of the experiments meta-analysed in Rand (2016) used, as cognitive manipulation, time 
constraints (27 out of 51 studies) and conceptual primes of intuition (11 out of 51 studies). 
Among the remaining studies, only three of them used ego-depletion (Capraro & Cococcioni, 
2016), one of them used foreign language (Urbin et al, 2016), and none of them used 
cognitive load. The remaining studies included in the meta-analysis either used the trust 
game, or were obtained as last-rounds of iterated games (Duffy & Smith, 2014; Døssing, 
Piovesan, & Wengström, 2017, de Haan & van Veldhuizen, 2015; Osgood & Muraven, 
2015), or regarded situations in which cooperating with one player implies competing with a 
third party (De Dreu, Dussel & Ten Velden, 2015). A similar asymmetry of studies concerns 
also the other two meta-analyses (Kvarven et al., 2019; Rand, 2019), which essentially differs 
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from the original one mainly in the 21 time-pressure studies included in the preregistered 
replication by Bouwmeester et al. (2017). Additionally, the only study using neurostimulation 
(Li et al, 2018) is not included in any of these meta-analyses. Since most time constraint 
studies have been criticized (because time pressure increases selection bias and confusion) 
and since conceptual priming of intuition has its own limitations (because it might create 
experimental demand effect), I believe that the current empirical evidence on the cognitive 
underpinning of cooperation should be complemented by further experiments using, as 
cognitive process manipulations, ego-depletion, cognitive load, and neurostimulation. 
 
Open problem. Exploring the effect of ego-depletion, cognitive load, and neurostimulation on 
cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas. 
 
Another important question regards the role of potential moderators. As suggested by two 
correlational studies and one causal study, the effect of cognitive manipulations on 
cooperation might depend on the type of participants, such that pro-socials might become 
more cooperative when deciding intuitively (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 2016; Alós-Ferrer & 
Garagnani, 2018), whereas individualists might be unaffected (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 
2016; Alós-Ferrer & Garagnani, 2018) or even become more selfish (Yamagishi et al, 2017). 
Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani (2018), in particular, proposed that time pressure makes people 
more likely to behave according to their social value orientation, while time delay makes 
people readapt this initial response towards what they believe to be the norm in the given 
situation. Testing this hypothesis is an important direction for future research. Note that this 
hypothesis does not necessarily conflict with the SHH, because the SHH makes predictions 
about the cooperativeness of the environment in which participants live, and not about the 
participants’ SVO. More precisely, the SHH contends that System 1 promotes cooperation 
among participants who live in a cooperative environment, but not among those who live in a 
non-cooperative setting, who are predicted to remain unaffected by the cognitive 
manipulation. In agreement with this prediction, previous research has found that trust in 
daily life moderates the positive effect of time pressure on cooperation (Rand & Kraft-Todd, 
2014), and that time pressure does not have affect cooperative behaviour among participants 
living in a non-cooperative setting (Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015). Whether and to what 
extent a participant’s SVO and the cooperativeness of the environment in which a participant 
lives are related is, to the best of my knowledge, not known. In any case, I believe that 
exploring the moderating role of the SVO on the cognitive basis of cooperation is a 
fundamental direction for future research. 
 
Open problem. Exploring the effect of intuition and deliberation on cooperation as a function 
of participants’ SVO.  
 
Another important line of research regards the existence of a potential inverted-U effect of 
cognitive effort on cooperation. Study 3 in Moore and Tenbrunsel (2014) found that 
cognitive complexity has an inverted-U effect on cooperation in a non-incentivized, social 
dilemma based on the Shark Harvesting and Resource Conservation exercise. Capraro & 
Cococcioni (2016) used this result to explain why extreme cognitive depletions (extreme time 
pressure and ego-depletion) seem to give rise to lower pro-sociality: it is possible that the 
effect of cognitive effort on cooperative behaviour is non-linear. The theoretical rational for 
this assumption is that cooperation might be partly driven by an abstract desire to do the 
morally right thing (Capraro & Rand, 2018). And it has been long argued that the application 
of abstract moral rules is not immediate, but appears only at later stages of moral reasoning 
(Kohlber, 1963). Therefore, exploring a potential inverted-U effect of cognitive reflection on 
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cooperation is a fascinating and non-trivial question, with obvious theoretical and practical 
implications. One important observation, in my opinion, is that this question is inherently 
difficult because it is very hard to implement extreme cognitive manipulations on 
participants: time pressure, cognitive load, ego depletion, and conceptual primes, all have the 
limitations that, when, the manipulation becomes really strict, drop-out rates increases, 
leading to potential selection biases. Studies using neurostimulation might overcome this 
limitation. The only study using neurostimulation that has been conducted so far found no 
evidence of an inverted-U effect: the control condition of Li et al (2018) gave rise to a rate of 
cooperation between the two cognitive process manipulations. But, clearly, more evidence is 
needed to allow general conclusions.   
 
Open problem. Exploring a potential inverted-U effect of cognitive reflection on cooperation. 
The use of neurostimulation could be particularly useful in this case. 
 
I would conclude with an observation regarding asymmetric social dilemmas. This type of 
dilemmas is very important in light of practical applications, because, in real-life, there is 
often power imbalance among people. This power imbalance can be formalized in terms of 
asymmetries between costs and benefits of cooperation. To the best of my knowledge, only 
two studies explored the cognitive underpinnings of cooperation in asymmetric dilemmas, 
and they led to opposite results: Lotz (2015) used conceptual primes and found that intuition 
promotes cooperation; conversely, Li et al (2018) used neurostimulation and found that 
activity in the DLPFC is linked to cooperation. Clearly, more studies are needed on this topic. 
 
Open problem. Exploring the cognitive underpinnings of cooperation in asymmetric social 
dilemmas. 
 
 
 
 
4. The cognitive underpinnings of altruism 
 
People often pay costs to help others even in situations where the other person has no way to 
reciprocate the action. A typical example is when they donate their change to a homeless 
person along the street. The notion of altruism formalizes the core of this type of interactions. 
Formally speaking, altruism is when a decision-maker pays a cost to help someone else. The 
recipient of the altruistic action could be a single individual, but also a group of individuals, 
as, for example, a humanitarian organization.  
 
 
4.1. Measure of altruism: The dictator game 
 
In the dictator game, a player, the dictator, is given a certain amount of money, and has to 
decide how much of it, if any, to donate to another player, the recipient, who is initially given 
nothing. The recipient has no choice and only gets what the dictator decides to give. 
 
Clearly, the dictator has no monetary incentive to give part of their endowment to the 
recipient. Therefore, the payoff-maximizing strategy is to give nothing. However, laboratory 
experiments show that a significant proportion of people actually give part of their 
endowment. According to Engel’s (2011) meta-analysis of 616 dictator game experiments, 
the average donation is 28.3% of the amount, the distribution of donations is typically 
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bimodal, with main modes at “giving nothing” and “giving half”. Altruistic behaviour 
measured through the dictator game is related to cooperation measured through social 
dilemmas (Capraro et al., 2014; Peysakhovich et al., 2014), but they are different: people who 
give in the DG typically cooperate in the PD, but not the converse (Capraro et al., 2014). 
 
In the standard version of the dictator game, the recipient is a person. However, one can 
consider variants in which the recipient is, for example, an organization. A variant that has 
received considerable attention takes the name of charitable giving, where the recipient of the 
donation is a charitable organization. In this review, I will focus on both standard dictator 
game experiments and charitable giving experiments.  
 
Another variant of the dictator game can be obtained by changing the ratio between the cost 
and the benefit of the altruistic action. For example, when the cost of helping is smaller than 
the benefit created. In this case, the altruistic action does not help the other person, but also 
increases social efficiency. This might muddle things, especially in light of the research 
suggesting that equity and efficiency might be cognitively different (see Section 6). For this 
reason, I opted for including in this review only studies implementing a dictator game where 
the cost of the altruistic action is equal to its benefit. In Section 4.4, nevertheless, I will 
briefly review also the literature on the cognitive basis of altruism in dictator games with 
varying cost-to-benefit ratio. 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Review of the empirical evidence 
 
Studies using time constraints led to mixed results. Carlson, Aknin and Liotti (2016) 
conducted a series of charitable giving experiments under time pressure versus time delay 
and found no differences in donations depending on the cognitive process manipulation. 
Along the same lines, Tinghög et al (2016) found that time pressure does not affect charitable 
donations to four different humanitarian organizations (Save the Children, WWF, Doctors 
Without Borders, and UNICEF). Jarke and Lohse (2016) found that time pressure has no 
effect on altruistic decisions in a binary dictator game in which dictators have to choose 
between (5,5) and (8,2). Similarly, Andersen, Gneezy, Kajackaite and Marx (2018) found 
that allowing one day of reflection time does not alter dictator game giving. However, Mrkva 
(2017) found that time delay, compared to baseline, increases charitable donations, whereas 
Gärtner (2018) found that time pressure increases self-regarding decisions in the dictator 
game, but only when the dictator game is presented without a status-quo; in contrast, Gärtner 
(2018) found that time pressure has no effect on decisions when the status-quo is on the self-
regarding choice or on the altruistic choice. Chuan, Kessler and Milkman (2018) found that 
30-day time delay between the provision of medical care and a donation solicitation 
decreases the likelihood of a donation by 30%. Grolleau, Sutan, El Harbi and Jedidi (2018) 
found that time delay decreases dictator game giving in Tunisia. Artavia-Mora, Bedi and 
Rieger (2017) and Artavia-Mora, Bedi and Rieger (2018) found that time pressure increases 
help in a natural field experiment in which participants had to return a loss glove. 
 
Several studies have investigated the effect of cognitive load on altruism. An earlier paper by 
Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison and Dent (2000) found that cognitive load increases the 
amount that people take from a common pool. Cornelissen, Dewitte and Warlop (2011) 
explored the differential effect of cognitive load on individualists and pro-socials. They found 
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that cognitive load favours altruistic choices in the dictator game, but only among pro-social 
individuals; in contrast, non-cognitively loaded pro-socials gave as much as non-cognitively 
loaded individualists, whose behaviour was not affected by the cognitive manipulation. 
Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni and Utikal (2014) conducted a series of 20 mini dictator games 
with varying inequality but keeping the social efficiency constant (100 points for 10 games 
and 94 for 10 games). In doing so, they found that cognitive load increases generosity. 
However, several other works failed to find a significant effect of cognitive load on altruism. 
Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2013) found no effect of cognitive load on dictator game 
giving. Kessler and Meier (2014) conducted a cognitive load manipulation on charitable 
giving to the Red Cross and found no effect. Also, Tinghög et al (2016) found no effect of 
cognitive load on charitable giving.  Similarly, Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson-
Stenman and Svedsäter (2016) found no effect on cognitive load on dictator game donations. 
Finally, Grossman and Van der Weele (2017) found no effect of cognitive load on charitable 
giving. 
 
I am aware of only three studies exploring conceptual priming of intuition and deliberation 
on altruism. An early paper by Small, Loewenstein and Sloviv (2007) found that priming 
intuition versus deliberation increases giving to a charity, but only when the victim is 
identifiable and not statistical. More recently, Zhong (2011) found that participants give more 
to a charity organization (Child Family Health International) when they are asked how much 
they feel to give compared to when they are asked how much they decide to give. Finally, 
Kinnunen and Windmann (2013) found no differences in donations to Greenpeace.  
 
The effect of ego depletion on giving was instead explored by a multitude of studies. Halali, 
Bereby-Meyer and Oxenfels (2013) found that depleted participants choose the equal split in 
the dictator game less often than non-depleted participants. Along the same lines, Achtziger, 
Alós-Ferrer and Wagner (2015) found that depleted participant give less than non-depleted 
participants in the dictator game. Itzchakov, Uziel and Wood (2018) found that depleted 
participants donate less to charity than non-depleted participants, but only when seeing a 
persuasion message, whereas there was no effect when the persuasion message was not 
present. Particularly interesting is the work of Banker, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Ariely and 
Vohs (2017). They found that depleted participants give less than non-depleted ones in the 
standard dictator game; however, they also found that the effect reverses in the dictator game 
in the take frame, where the endowment is initially given to the recipient. They interpret this 
finding as suggesting that ego depletion neither makes people more selfish nor more 
altruistic: it simply makes them more likely to adopt the status quo. Dickinson and McElroy 
(2017) found that sleep restriction decreases altruistic behaviour in the dictator game. 
Rantapuska et al (2017) found that hunger does not affect charitable giving. Finally, Ferrara 
et al. (2015) found that sleep deprivation decreases dictator game giving, but only for 
females.  
 
Finally, there are three studies exploring the effect of brain stimulation on altruistic 
behaviour. Ruff, Ugazio and Fehr (2013) found that transcranial direct current stimulation of 
the rLPFC decreased dictator game giving, while disruption of the rLPFC increased DG 
giving, relative to the placebo, “sham”, condition. Strang et al (2015) used transcranial 
magnetic stimulation to explore the effect of activating or disrupting the rDLPFC on giving 
in the dictator game. They found that disrupting the rDLPFC led to less giving, compared to 
disrupting the lDLPFC and compared to the placebo, “sham”, condition. A more recent study 
argued that disruption of the rLPFC does not simply increase altruism or selfishness, but it 
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has the effect of making individuals more likely to follow rules of behaviour (Gross et al., 
2018). 
 
 
Altruism 
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Carlson et al. (2016) Charitable giving No effect of Pressure compared to Delay 
Jarke & Lohse (2016) Dictator game No effect of Pressure compared to Delay 
Tinghög et al. (2016) Charitable giving No effect of Pressure compared to Delay 
Artavia-Mora et al. (2017) Field experiment Pressure increases helping 
Mrkva (2017) Charitable giving Delay increases giving, compared to Baseline 
Artavia-Mora et al. (2018) Field experiment Pressure increases helping 
Andersen et al. (2018) Dictator game No effect of Delay compared to Baseline 
Chuan et al. (2018) Charitable giving Delay decreases giving 
Gärtner (2018) Dictator game Pressure decreases giving, only when the 
dictator game is presented with no status-quo  
Grolleau et al. (2018) Dictator game Delay decreases giving  
Cognitive load studies   
Roch et al. (2000) Taking from common pool Load increases taking 
Cornelissen et al. (2011)  Dictator game Load increases giving among pro-socials; no 
effect among individualists 
Benjamin et al. (2013) Dictator game Load has no effect on giving 
Schulz et al. (2014) Dictator game Load increases giving 
Kessler & Meier (2014) Charitable giving Load has no effect on giving 
Hauge et al. (2016) Dictator game Load has no effect on giving 
Tinghög et al. (2016) Charitable giving Load has no effect on giving 
Grossman & Van der Weele 
(2017) 
Charitable giving Load has no effect on giving 
Cognitive primes studies   
Small et al. (2007) Charitable giving Intuition increases giving, but only when the 
target is identifiable and not when is statistical 
Zhong (2011) Charitable giving “Feel” increases giving, compared to “Decide” 
Kinnunen & Windmann (2013) Charitable giving Intuition has no effect on giving, compared to 
Deliberation 
Ego depletion studies   
Halali et al. (2013) Dictator game Depletion decreases frequency of equal split 
Achtziger et al. (2015) Dictator game Depletion decreases giving 
Ferrara et al. (2015) Dictator game Sleep restriction decreases giving, but only 
among females 
Banker et al. (2017) Dictator game Depletion has no effect on giving, it only makes 
participants more likely to choose the status quo 
Dickinson & McElroy (2017) Dictator game Sleep restriction decreases giving 
Rantapuska et al. (2017) Charitable giving  Hunger has no effect on giving 
Itzchakov et al. (2018) Charitable giving Depletion decreases giving, but only when 
giving is accompanied by a persuasion message 
Neurostimulation studies   
Ruff et al. (2013) Dictator game rLPFC stimulation decreases giving, relative to 
sham; rLPFC inhibition increases giving 
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Strang et al. (2015) Dictator game DLPFC stimulation increases giving, relative to 
sham; DLPFC inhibition decreases giving 
Gross et al. (2018) Dictator game rLPFC inhibition has no effect on altruism or 
selfishness, but only makes people more likely to 
follow rules of behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. Meta-analyses and the mysterious role of gender 
 
Given the mixed evidence above, scholars have recently turned to meta-analytic techniques, 
looking also at the effect of potential moderators. In particular, one moderator that has 
attracted considerable attention is gender. There is a theoretical reason for this interest. 
Previous work suggests that men and women tend to behave according to stereotypes 
regarding their social roles, with women being more communal and unselfish, and men being 
more agentic and independent (Eagly, 1987). In agreement with this view, empirical research 
repeatedly found that women tend to be more altruistic than men in the dictator game (Croson 
& Gneezy, 2009; Brañas-Garza, Capraro & Rascón-Ramírez, 2018), that women are expected 
to be more altruistic than men in the dictator game (Aguiar, Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, 
Jimenez & Miller, 2009; Brañas-Garza, Capraro & Rascón-Ramírez, 2018), and that when 
women behave in a way that is perceived to be insufficiently altruistic, they are liked less, 
less likely to be helped, hired, promoted, paid fairly, and given status (Heilman & Okimoto, 
2007). Therefore, one might expect that altruism has been internalized as an intuitive strategy 
for women but not for men.  
 
Following this idea, Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro and Barcelo (2016) meta-analysed 22 
dictator game experiments (total N = 4,366) manipulating cognitive process. They found that 
System 1 promotes altruism for women but not for men. Moreover, in line with the 
aforementioned interpretation, in a second study published in the same work, Rand et al. 
(2016) also found that the more women described themselves using masculine attributes 
relative to feminine attributes, the more System 2 reduced their altruism.  
 
However, a more recent meta-analysis (Fromell, Nosenzo & Owens, 2018) found an 
interaction between gender and cognitive mode, in a slightly different direction than Rand et 
al. (2016). Specifically, Fromell et al. (2018) meta-analysed 19 studies (total N = 10,898) 
and, in line with Rand et al (2016), they found that there is an interaction between gender and 
cognitive process manipulation; however, in contrast to Rand et al. (2016), they found that 
promoting System 1 has no effect on women, whereas it has a marginally significant negative 
effect on men. It is worth noticing that Fromell et al. (2018) used broader inclusion criteria 
than those used by Rand et al (2016). In particular, they included also dictator games in 
which the recipient was a charitable organization and those with varying cost-to-benefit ratio.  
 
In sum, two meta-analyses of the cognitive basis of altruistic behaviour agree on the 
existence of a differential effect on women and men, but they disagree with the main effect: 
Rand et al (2016) argue that System 1 favours altruism for women but not for men; Fromell 
et al (2018) argue that System 1 disfavours altruism for men but not for women. 
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It is worth concluding by saying that both these meta-analyses have limitations. First, none of 
them contains study using neurostimulation. Second, Rand et al.’s (2016) meta-analysis 
includes a relatively small number of studies, as many experiments were published after the 
meta-analysis. In contrast, although Fromell et al. (2018) include more studies, they also 
include studies using dictator games in which the altruistic option also maximizes social 
welfare. The inclusion of these studies can create a confound because it is known that men 
are more altruistic than women in these situations (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Altruism with varying cost to benefit ratio 
 
For completeness, in this section I review also papers exploring the cognitive basis of 
altruism in situations in which the cost of the altruistic action is different than its benefit.  
 
The majority of these studies used time constraints. Capraro, Corgnet, Espín and Hernán-
González (2017) built on a previous correlational study (Corgnet et al, 2015) and conducted a 
series of mini-dictator games that were used to classify participants into self-regarding, 
spiteful, inequity averse, or socially efficient. The classification was done in two ways: using 
a generalized version of the Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) model; and using consistency across 
choices. Independently of the classification method being used and both in the USA and in 
India, Capraro et al. (2017) found that time pressure (and low scores in the CRT) were 
associated with spitefulness and inequity aversion, while time delay (and high scores in the 
CRT) were associated with social efficiency. Chen and Krajbich (2018) conducted a 
sequence of 200 binary dictator games, with varying cost to benefit ratios. They classified 
participants into pro-socials and individualists, by using Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) model. In 
doing so, Chen and Krajbich (2018) found that time pressure made pro-socials more 
prosocial and individualists more self-regarding. Krawczyk and Sylwestrzak (2018) 
conducted a battery of dictator games with varying cost to benefit ratios. Participants were 
incentivized to give a fast choice, which then they were able to revise. In doing so, they 
found that time pressure increased envy, that is, pressured participants were more likely to 
decrease the payoff of the other person, but only when this payoff was higher than their own. 
Finally, Merkel & Lohse (2019) conducted a time pressure vs time delay vs no time 
constraint experiment using four binary dictator games with varying cost-to-benefit ratios. 
The cost to benefit ratio was, in some cases, smaller than 1, and, in other cases, larger than 1. 
They found that time pressure does not affect the rate of altruism, independently of the cost-
to-benefit ratio.  
 
Beyond time constraints, I am aware of only two studies using ego-depletion. Friehe and 
Schildberg-Hörisch (2017) found no effect of ego-depletion on a taking game in which the 
recipient is given 20 points and the dictator can take any amount from the recipient, knowing 
that any amount taken would be divided by 4. Balafoutas, Kerschbamer and Oexl (2018) 
found no effect of ego-depletion on a series of mini-dictator games built to measure aversion 
to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.  
 
 
 
 
4.5. Outlook and open problems 
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As described above, single studies looking at the effect of cognitive manipulations on 
altruistic behaviour show mixed results. However, at the meta-analytic level, there is 
agreement that intuition and deliberation have no overall effect on altruistic behaviour. This, 
clearly, does not imply that the effect is not present in any subclass of people. Instead, this 
leads to a general research question regarding the role of potential moderators in determining 
for which classes of people altruism turns out to be the automatic response. 
 
One important moderator is gender. Two meta-analyses reached a similar conclusion: the 
cognitive basis of altruism among women differ from the cognitive basis of altruism among 
men. However, these two meta-analyses disagree on the directions of the main effects: Rand 
et al. (2016) argue that intuition favours altruism for women but not for men; Fromell et al. 
(2018) argue that intuition disfavours altruism for men but not for women. Therefore, a 
primary direction for future research is to clarify the interaction between cognitive process 
and gender in determining altruistic behaviour. 
 
Open problem. Clarifying the interaction between cognitive process and gender in 
determining altruistic behaviour. 
 
Another promising moderator could be the SVO (or similar methods to classify participants 
according to their social preferences). Indeed, it might be that intuition favours altruism only 
among people with pro-social preferences. However, to the best of our knowledge, only one 
study has investigated this question. Cornelissen et al. (2011) explored the differential effect 
of cognitive load on individualists vs pro-socials (classified according to their SVO measured 
using Leibrand’s (1984) ring measure) and indeed found that cognitive load favours dictator 
game giving, but only among pro-socials; in contrast, non-cognitively loaded pro-socials 
individuals gave as much as non-cognitively loaded individualists. Another study looked at a 
similar question, but with dictator games with varying cost to benefit ratios and reported 
similar results (Chen and Krajbich, 2018). In any case, this is a research question that is 
certainly worth being investigated more.  
 
Open problem. Exploring the interaction between cognitive process and SVO (or similar 
constructs) in determining altruistic behaviour. 
 
The aforementioned work by Banker et al (2017) suggests that ego-depletion does not 
actually promote selfish behaviour, but simply makes people more likely to choose the status-
quo, which, in the standard dictator game, turns out to coincide with selfishness. However, 
with the exception of Gärtner (2018), no one has tried to explore the same potential confound 
using other cognitive manipulations, and possibly looking at the interaction between with 
gender and SVO. It is, indeed, in principle possible that the overall effects reported in the 
meta-analyses are confounded with the status-quo bias. 
 
Open problem. Exploring the cognitive underpinnings of altruistic behaviour by controlling 
for status-quo bias. 
 
 
 
 
5. The cognitive underpinnings of honesty 
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The conflict between honesty and dishonesty is at the core of all social and economic 
interactions that include communication with asymmetric information. In these cases, people 
may be tempted to misreport their private information for their benefit. Indeed, previous 
empirical work, as well as everyday experience, suggests that some people take advantage of 
their private information and use it for their benefit. As a consequence, dishonesty has an 
enormous negative impact on people, companies, and the society as a whole. For example, 
tax evasion costs about 100 billion a year only to the US government (Gravelle, 2009). 
Understanding whether intuition favour or disfavour dishonest behaviour is therefore a topic 
of primary importance.  
 
 
 
 
5.1. Measures of honesty 
 
There are several ways to measure people’s dishonest behaviour. These measures can be 
classified in two types: those where lying harms an “abstract” person (e.g., the experimenter), 
and those where lying harms a “concrete” person (e.g., another participant in the experiment). 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1. Cheating tasks (lying harms “abstract” others) 
 
One simple way to measure people’s (dis)honesty in situations in which lying harms an 
abstract person is to have participants complete a task and then pay them according to the 
self-reported performance in this task. In this case, the abstract person harmed by the lie is 
the experimenter.  
 
A popular type of task that has been used for this purpose is the so-called “matrix task” 
(Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013). In the proto-typical version of 
this task, participants are presented with a series of, for example, twenty 4x3 matrices, whose 
entries are all three-digit numbers between 0 and 10 (e.g, 1.34). Participants are given four 
minutes to find two numbers per matrix that add up to 10. Finally, participants are paid 
according to the self-reported performance in the task. Of course, this is not the only task that 
fits this purpose. For example, Muraven, Pogarsky and Shmueli (2006) used logic puzzles 
that were modified in such a way to be unsolvable; Zhong (2011) used maths problems; 
Pitesa, Thau and Pillutla (2013) used performance in the Raven matrix test. 
 
Another popular example of cheating task is the dice-under-cup task (or dice-rolling task). 
Here, participants roll a dice, in private (under a cup), and then they are paid according to the 
reported outcome (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). 
 
 
5.1.2. The sender-receiver game (lying harms “concrete” others) 
 
Lying when it harms concrete others is typically measured through the sender-receiver game. 
This game has been initially introduced by Gneezy (2005). Here, for simplicity, I describe a 
later variant, defined in Erat and Gneezy (2012), which is conceptually equivalent to the 
original version. In this game, the sender is given a private piece of information, as, for 
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example, the outcome of rolling a dice. Then the sender sends a message to the receiver, 
chosen among a set of possible messages. In this case, there would be six possible messages: 
“The outcome of rolling the dice was i”, with i from 1 to 6. The role of the receiver is to 
guess the original piece of information, as, in this case, the true outcome of the dice. If the 
receiver guesses the true piece of information, then the sender and the receiver get paid 
according to some Option A; if the receiver does not guess the original piece of information, 
then the sender and the receiver get paid according to some Option B. Crucially, only the 
sender knows the monetary payoffs associated to Option A and Option B. 
 
The sender-receiver generates a potential confound, known as “sophisticated deception” 
(Sutter, 2009): there might be senders who tell the truth not because they want to be honest, 
but because they want to be dishonest but, at the same time, they expect to not be believed by 
the receiver. In order to eliminate this confound, scholars have recently explored variants of 
the sender-receiver game in which the receiver does not make any decision (Biziou van Pol, 
Haenen, Novaro, Occhipinti-Liberman & Capraro, 2015; Cappelen, Sørensen and 
Tungodden, 2013; Gneezy, Rockenbach & Serra-Garcia, 2013). 
 
One of the reasons why the sender-receiver game is particularly useful is because it allows 
researchers to distinguish four types of lies, depending on their monetary consequences. 
Specifically, following the taxonomy of Erat and Gneezy (2012), we define: 
 
• Black lies, those that benefit the sender at a cost for the receiver 
• Spiteful lies, those that harm both the sender and the receiver 
• Altruistic white lies, those that help the receiver at a cost for the sender 
• Pareto white lies, those that help both the sender and the receiver 
 
Nevertheless, most of the studies looking at the cognitive underpinnings of lying in the 
sender-receiver game focused on the black lies. Therefore, unless explicitly stated differently, 
in what follows I will always assume that lying in the sender-receiver game would increase 
the sender’s payoff at a cost for the receiver. 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Review of the empirical evidence 
 
A number of studies have explored the effect of time pressure and time delay in the decision 
to lie. Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang and Murnighan (2012) found that three minutes of 
contemplation increased honesty in a sender-receiver game, compared to the baseline, with 
no time constraint. Symmetrically, Shalvi, Eldar and Bereby-Meyer (2012) found that a 20-
second time pressure increased cheating in a dice-rolling task, compared to a condition with 
no time constraint. This line of research has been challenged by four more recent studies. 
Foerster, Pfister, Schmidts, Dignath and Kunde (2013) criticized previous experiments 
because participants could in principle generate their answer before the cognitive 
manipulation and therefore the truth need not be inhibited. To avoid this confound, Foerster 
et al. (2013) implemented a modified design in which participants have to report the 
outcomes of a series or dice roll either immediately after the roll or after a delay. They found 
that participants who are asked to report the outcome immediately are more honest than those 
under time delay. Along the same lines, Capraro (2017) and Capraro, Schulz and Rand 
(2019) found that a 5-second time pressure increased honesty in a sender-receiver game (in 
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which the private information was communicated at the same time as the timer started), 
compared to a 30-second time delay. Lohse, Simon and Konrad (2018) found that time 
pressure increased honesty in a situation in which participants could misreport a private 
information for their benefit, and the effect was due to a lack of awareness of the opportunity 
to lie. Finally, Andersen et al. (2018) found no effect of one-day reflection time on a cheating 
game very similar to a dice-rolling task.  
To the best of my knowledge, only one study used cognitive load to manipulate cognitive 
process during a lying task: van’t Veer, Stel and Van Beest (2014) found that cognitive load 
increased honesty in a dice-rolling experiment.  
In contrast, several studies have investigated the effect of conceptual priming of intuition and 
deliberation on lying. Zhong (2011) found that promoting deliberation, through a math 
problem-solving task, versus promoting emotional-based choices, through a task in which 
participants have to report their feeling in a number of situations (Hsee & Rottenstreicht, 
2004; Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007), promoted lying in a sender-receiver game. 
These results thus suggest that emotions favour honesty, while deliberation favours 
dishonesty. Zhong (2011) also replicated this finding using a different manipulation, that is, 
by framing a choice as a decision rather than an intuitive reaction. Cappelen et al. (2013) 
studied the cognitive basis of lying in a sender-receiver game with Pareto white lie payoffs. 
The choice of setting the payoffs in the Pareto white lie domain was justified by the aim of 
looking at intrinsic lying aversion, cleared by any confound that could potentially be caused 
by the monetary consequences of lying. In fact, in Cappelen et al. (2013), lying maximized 
the individual payoff and the social welfare and, additionally, it minimized the inequity 
between the sender and the receiver. Consequently, in Cappelen et al. (2013), telling the truth 
would be entirely driven by lying aversion. In doing so, Cappelen et al. (2013) found that 
promoting intuition favoured honesty, but only for males. Motro, Ordóñez, Pittarello and 
Welsh (2018) let participants write about a time in their life in which they felt angry vs guilt; 
they found that inducing anger made people more likely to act dishonesty, while inducing 
guilt made people more honest. Finally, Bereby-Meyer et al (in press) found that using a 
second language increased honesty.  
The effect of ego-depletion on dishonesty has also been largely explored. Results generally 
agree that ego-depletion favours dishonest behaviour in cheating tasks. Muraven, Pogarsky 
and Shmueli (2006) found that ego-depletion promoted cheating in a task in which 
participants are paid according to the number of problems they reported having solved. Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer and Ariely (2009) found that ego-depletion increased 
dishonesty in a matrix task. Additionally, they also found that depleted participants were 
more likely than non-depleted ones to expose themselves to the possibility of cheating. Gotlib 
and Converse (2010) found that ego-depletion increased dishonesty (in the form of leaving a 
room before the designated end time). Gino, Schweitzer, Mead and Ariely (2011) replicated 
the result that ego-depletion increases dishonesty in a matrix task and, additionally, they 
showed that resisting temptations to behave unethically both required and depleted self-
control resources. Pitesa, Thau and Pillutla (2013) found that impairing cognitive control 
increased cheating in a situation in which participants have to pay themselves according to 
the performance in a Raven matrix task, but only when the negative consequences of cheating 
on other people are not made salient. If these consequences were made salient, then the effect 
even reversed: impairing cognitive control increased honesty. Along these lines, Yam, Chen 
and Reynolds (2014) studied the effect of ego-depletion on dishonesty as a function of social 
consensus about the badness of the dishonest action. They found that ego-depletion increased 
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dishonesty only in situations in which there was low social agreement that the dishonest 
action was actually bad; conversely, when there was high consensus about the badness of the 
dishonest action, there was a reversal of the effect, such that ego-depletion increased honesty. 
Chiou, Wu and Cheng (2017) found that lowering self-control in men by showing them 
pictures of attractive women increased dishonesty in a matrix task (the same ego-depletion 
technique did not seem to work for women, whose self-control resources was not affected by 
pictures of attractive men). Yam (2018) found that suppressing ethics-unrelated thoughts – a 
technique known to deplete self-control (Richerson & Shelton, 2004; Gordijn et al, 2004) – 
led to more cheating in a task in which participants were paid according to the performance 
they reported. Interestingly, when asked to suppress ethics-related thoughts, participants 
became more honest, suggesting that suppressing ethics-related thoughts can increase moral 
awareness. The only study finding no effect that I am aware of is by Welsh, Ellis, Christian 
and Mai (2014), who found no correlation between sleep deprivation and deceptive behaviour 
in a sender-receiver game. 
Two studies have explored the effect of brain stimulation on honesty. Maréchal, Cohn, 
Ugazio and Ruff (2017) found that transcranial direct current stimulation of the rDLPFC 
increased honesty in a die-rolling task, when lying would benefit the participants themselves, 
but not when it would benefit another person. Gao, Yang, Shi, Lin and Chen (2018) used 
transcranial direct current stimulation over the DLPFC during a sender-receiver game. In 
doing so, they found that, in the sham condition, males were more honest than females, while 
stimulation of the right DLPFC made gender differences to disappear by increasing honesty 
for females, but not for males. However, the authors themselves noted that one potential 
limitation of their study was that the rate of honesty among males in the sham condition was 
already quite high, and this implied that there was little space for statistical changes. 
 
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Gunia et al. (2012) Sender-Receiver game Delay increases honesty, compared to Baseline 
Shalvi et al. (2012) Die-rolling task Pressure decreases honesty, compared to 
Baseline 
Foerster et al. (2013) Die-rolling task  Pressure increases honesty, compared to 
Baseline 
Capraro (2017) Sender-Receiver game Pressure increases honesty, compared to Delay 
Andersen et al. (2018) Self-serving cheating task Delay has no effect on honesty, compared to 
Baseline 
Lohse et al. (2018)  Self-serving cheating task Pressure increases honesty, by making 
participants less aware of the opportunity to lie 
Capraro et al. (2019) Sender-Receiver game Pressure increases honesty, compared to Delay 
Cognitive load studies   
van’t Veer et al. (2014) Die-rolling task Load increases honesty 
Conceptual primes studies   
Cappelen et al. (2013) Sender-Receiver game 
with Pareto white lie 
payoffs 
Intuition increases honesty, compared to 
Deliberation, but only for males 
Motro et al. (2018) Self-serving cheating task Emotion increases honesty, compared to 
Deliberation 
 34 
Zhong (2011) Sender-receiver game Emotion increases honesty, compared to 
Deliberation 
Bereby-Meyer et al. (in press) Die-rolling task Second language decreases honesty 
Ego depletion studies   
Muraven et al. (2006) Self-serving cheating task Ego depletion decreases honesty 
Mead et al. (2009) Self-serving cheating task Ego depletion decreases honesty 
Gotlib & Converse (2010) Self-serving cheating task  Ego depletion decreases honesty 
Gino et al. (2011) Self-serving cheating task  Ego depletion decreases honesty 
Pitesa et al. (2013) Self-serving cheating task  Ego depletion decreases honesty, but only when 
consequences on others are not salient 
Welsh et al. (2014) Sender-Receiver game Ego depletion has no effect on honesty 
Yam et al. (2014) Self-serving cheating task  Ego depletion decreases honesty, but only when 
there is low social agreement that the dishonest 
action is immoral 
Chiuo et al. (2017) Self-serving cheating task Ego depletion decreases honesty (male sample) 
Yam (2018) Self-serving cheating task Ego depletion decreases honesty 
Neurostimulation studies   
Maréchal et al. (2017) Die-rolling task DLPFC stimulation increases honesty, but only 
when lying would benefit the decision-maker 
and not when it would benefit a third party 
Gao et al. (2018)  Sender-Receiver game DLPFC stimulation increases honesty, but only 
for females 
 
 
 
 
5.3. A meta-analysis 
 
As reviewed in the previous section, also in the domain of honest behaviour, the evidence is 
quite mixed. A recent meta-analysis suggests, however, that there might be an overall effect, 
although depending on whether lying harms abstract others or concrete others. Specifically, 
Köbis, Verschuere, Bereby-Meyer, Rand and Shalvi (in press) meta-analysed all the studies 
manipulating cognitive process during a lying task and looked at variability in the proportion 
of liars (73 studies, N=12,711) and in the magnitude of liars (50 studies, n=6,473). In doing 
so, they found that promoting System 1 increases the proportion of liars and the magnitude of 
lying in cases in which lying harms abstract others, but not in cases in which lying harms 
concrete others. In the latter case, promoting System 1 over reflection has no effect on 
dishonest behaviour. Köbis et al. (in press) interpreted these results in lights of the Social 
Heuristics Hypothesis: when lying harms abstract others, the negative consequences of lying 
are not salient and participants tend to act in a self-interested way; in contrast, when lying 
harms concrete others and the negative consequences of lying are salient, self-interest 
conflicts with the intuitive social heuristics “do not harm”, that pushes in the opposite 
direction, and nullifies the effect of promoting intuition on dishonesty. 
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5.4. Outlook and open problems 
 
Virtually all studies explored the cognitive underpinnings of black lies. To the best of my 
knowledge, only one study implemented Pareto white lies (Cappelen et al, 2013) and another 
one investigated altruistic white lies (Maréchal et al, 2017). Exploring the cognitive basis of 
lies other than black is an important direction for future research for different reasons. Pareto 
white lies are of great theoretical interest, because they represent the setting in which one can 
measure pure, intrinsic, lying aversion, depurated from any other confound (e.g. in the case of 
black lies, telling the truth coincides with being altruistic). It is noteworthy that the only one 
study that manipulated cognitive process in Pareto white lie situations found honesty to be 
intuitive, providing a first piece of evidence that pure lying aversion is automatic. However, 
and especially in light of the Reproducibility Crisis (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), 
more studies should be conducted using Pareto white lies. It would also be interesting to 
explore the effect of promoting intuition versus deliberation in the decision to tell altruistic 
white lies and spiteful lies. In this case, predictions are not obvious. Previous research 
suggests that time pressure increases spiteful behaviour (Capraro et al, 2017). Therefore, it 
might be possible that it also increases spiteful lying. Similarly, previous work suggests that 
promoting intuition has no overall effect on altruism (Rand et al, 2016; Fromell et al, 2018). 
This suggests that there might be no overall effect of intuition on altruistic white lies. In any 
case, these are interesting questions that are worth being explored in future research.  
 
Open problem. Exploring the cognitive basis of honesty as a function of the type of lie (black 
lies, spiteful lies, altruistic white lies, and, especially, Pareto white lies). 
 
As reviewed above, there has been some research looking at the cognitive basis of honesty as 
a function of gender. Gender is known to influence lying and, by now, there are three meta-
analyses showing that men lie more than women (Abeler, Nosenzo & Raymond, in press; 
Capraro, 2018; Gerlach, Teodorescu & Hertwig, 2019). Therefore, it is natural to ask whether 
gender interacts with cognitive mode in determining the decision whether to lie. However, to 
the best of my knowledge, only two studies explored this topic. They both found gender 
differences in the cognitive basis of honesty, but they disagree on the details of this 
difference. Specifically, Cappelen et al (2013) found that conceptual priming of intuition 
favours honesty (in a sender-receiver game with Pareto white lies payoffs), but only among 
males. Gao et al (2018) found that transcranial direct current stimulation over the dLPFC 
increases honesty (in a sender-receiver game with black lies payoffs), but only for females. 
More studies should contribute to this debate. 
 
Open problem. Exploring the interaction between gender and cognitive mode in lying games. 
 
In most experiments on lying, the payoffs maximizing strategy is obvious is known to the 
participants since before the starting of the cognitive manipulation. For example, in the 
typical dice-rolling task, it is evident that the payoff maximizing strategy is to report that the 
outcome of the roll was 6. A similar situation happens with the typical sender-receiver game, 
in which the sender is informed about the payoffs associated with the two available options 
since before the cognitive manipulation. This has two consequences. The first one is that 
participants can in principle make a decision before the cognitive manipulation. The second 
one is that the (generalization of) the Social Heuristics Hypothesis cannot be applied in this 
case. According to the SHH, people bring to the lab heuristics learned in their everyday life 
and use them when they are in a situation in which they are depleted of the cognitive 
resources needed to compute the payoff maximizing strategy. If the payoff maximizing 
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strategy is already known, there is no room for the SHH. Motivated by this observation, two 
recent studies implemented a variant of the sender-receiver game in which participants were 
not initially informed about the payoff-maximizing option, but they had to infer it during the 
cognitive manipulation (Capraro, 2017; Capraro, Schulz & Rand, 2019). Both these studies 
found evidence that time pressure increased honesty, providing a first piece of evidence for a 
general form of the SHH, according to which, when participants do not have access to the 
payoff maximizing option, they tend to act honestly, arguably because honesty is payoff 
maximizing in the long-term, and therefore people internalized it as a useful heuristics. More 
works should be done to validate this theory by, for example, implementing lying tasks where 
the cognitive process manipulation is crossed with a manipulation of the moment in which 
participants are informed about the payoff maximizing option. 
 
Open problem. Exploring the cognitive basis of honesty as a function of the effort needed to 
infer the payoff-maximizing strategy.  
 
 
 
 
6. The cognitive basis of the equity-efficiency trade-off 
 
The natural distribution of a resource is often unequal, and creating equity is often costly. 
This generates a fundamental conflict between equity and efficiency, that has been named as 
“the fundamental problem in distributive justice” (Hsu et al., 2008) and “the big-trade-off” 
(Okun, 2015). See also Kohlberg (1931), Rawls (1971), Sen (2008). People who are in power 
of distributing resources often face this conflict. This thus leads to a conflict between equity 
and efficiency. For example, according to Okun’s “leaky bucket” argument, taxation is an 
instance of this conflict, because it increases equity, but it is costly for the institution that 
implements the tax. Understanding the cognitive basis of the conflict between equity and 
efficiency is therefore a topic of primary importance. However, as I will show in the next 
pages, very little is known about it. 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Measures of the equity-efficiency trade-off 
 
 
 
 
6.1.1. Trade-off games 
 
The trade-off between equity and efficiency is usually measured using the distribution 
experiments in which a decision maker has to decide between a choice that minimizes 
inequity among participants and a choice that maximizes the sum of the payoff of all 
participants (Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodden, 2010; Fehr, Glätze-Rützler & Sutter, 
2013; Martinsson, Nordblom, Rützler & Sutter, 2011; Meuwese, Crone, de Rooij & Güroğlu, 
2015; Capraro & Rand, 2018). The details can vary: the payoff of the decision-maker may or 
may not be affected by their action; in other situation, and efficiency may or may not harm 
one of the participants. 
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6.1.2. Suitable variants of the Social Value Orientation 
 
One can distinguish equitable choices from efficient ones also by means of a suitable variant 
of the SVO. One can indeed build a suitable battery of mini-dictator games with varying 
costs to benefits ratios in order to distinguish agents with preferences for equity from agents 
with preferences for social efficiency (Corgnet et al, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Review of the empirical evidence 
 
I am aware of only one study exploring the cognitive basis of the equity and efficiency 
payoff.11 Capraro et al. (2017) found that time pressure favours equitable allocations of 
money, while time delay favours efficient allocations. This result was shown to hold both in 
the US and in India.12  
 
 
 
 
6.3. Outlook and open problems 
 
Quite surprisingly, there is only one study exploring the cognitive basis of the equity-
efficiency trade-off. Therefore, there is urgency to conduct more studies. 
 
Open problem. Conducting more studies exploring the effect of cognitive manipulations on 
the equity-efficiency trade-off.  
 
 
Another important problem regards the role of potential moderators. One possible moderator 
is whether efficiency harms a third-party. As I will review below (Section 8), research on 
moral dilemmas suggests that instrumentally harming someone for the greater good interacts 
with cognitive mode such that intuition favours not harming someone, even if this has the 
effect of preventing a greater number of people from harm. Although moral dilemmas of this 
kind do not obviously map onto a trade-off between equity and efficiency, it is possible that, 
whether efficiency harms a third-party or not, moderates the role of cognitive mode on the 
equity-efficiency trade-off. Another possible moderator is gender. Previous work suggests 
that women are more likely than men to choose equity over efficiency (Andreoni & 
                                               
11Although correlational, it is worth mentioning the study of Hsu et al (2008), which used functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to study how people allocate meals to children in an orphanage in Uganda. In doing 
so, they found that equity choices are associated with activation in the insula, an area of the brain that is 
implicated with aversive social interactions and norm violation (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). Hsu et al. (2008) 
used this finding to suggest that “emotional responses related to norm violations may underlie individual 
differences in equity considerations” 
12Related to this, there is another correlational study by Corgnet et al. (2015). They analysed US and Spain 
samples and found that low scores in the CRT are correlated with equity, while high scores in the CRT are 
correlated with “mild altruism”, which is a form of efficiency, where people pay a small cost to generate a great 
group benefit. 
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Vesterlund, 2001; Fehr, Naef & Schmidt, 2006; Durante, Putterman & Van der Weele, 2014; 
Capraro, 2019). It is therefore possible that these gender differences in the equity-efficiency 
trade-off transfer to gender differences in the cognitive basis of this trade-off, such that 
intuition promotes equity for women but not for men. 
 
Open problem. Exploring the role of potential moderators of the effect of cognitive mode on 
the equity-efficiency trade-off. Two promising moderators are: whether effieciency harms a 
third party, and the gender of the decision-maker.  
 
 
 
 
7. The cognitive basis of reciprocity 
 
In the previous sections, I reviewed the cognitive basis of human sociality in situations in 
which either there is only one decision-maker (e.g., dictator games, cheating tasks, trade-off 
games) or, in cases there are multiple decision-makers, decisions are taken either 
simultaneously (e.g., prisoner’s dilemmas, public goods games) or without knowing each 
other’s decision (e.g., sender-receiver games). However, in reality, many interactions possess 
an element of reciprocity: the first mover makes a choice knowing that the second mover can 
respond to this choice. Particularly relevant is the case in which the first mover has to choose 
between a self-regarding choice and an other-regarding choice, knowing that the second 
mover (or a third-party) will have the opportunity to punish or reward the choice made by the 
first mover. In this section, I focus on this type of interactions.  
 
 
 
 
7.1. Measures of reciprocity 
 
 
 
 
7.1.1. Measures of negative reciprocity 
 
Negative reciprocity refers to situations in which one person has the choice to pay a cost to 
decrease the payoff of a decision-maker in response to a choice made by the decision-maker. 
The standard ways to measure negative reciprocity are through the ultimatum game (player 2) 
and through a social dilemma game followed by a punishment phase. In this latter case, the 
punisher might or might not be the target of the initial action. Situations in which the 
punisher is the target of the initial action take the name of second-party punishment; 
situations in which the punisher is not the target of the initial action take the names of third-
party punishment. Below, I describe these three kinds of interactions in more details. 
 
 
 
 
7.1.1.1. Second-party punishment 
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There are two standard ways to measure second-party punishment. The first one is through 
the second mover in the ultimatum game. In this game, Player 1, the proposer, has to propose 
how to divide a sum of money between her/himself and Player 2, the responder. The 
responder can either accept or reject the offer. In case the responder accepts the offer, then 
the money is split between the two players as agreed; in case the responder rejects the offer, 
neither the proposer nor the responder gets any money. Therefore, rejecting the proposer’s 
offer corresponds to paying a cost (equal to the offer) to decrease the payoff of the proposer. 
 
The others standard way to measure second-party punishment is through a social dilemma 
followed by a punishment phase, in which participants can punish each other, that is, they can 
pay a cost to decrease the payoff of other players. The details can be implemented in different 
ways. For instance, as a social dilemma, instead of the public goods game, one can use the 
prisoner’s dilemma; or, in the punishment phase, punishers, instead of targeting one 
particular player to be punished, they can punish all other players indiscriminately. 
 
 
 
 
7.1.1.2. Third-party punishment 
 
Third-party punishment is similar to second-party punishment, with the difference that the 
punisher does not play the social dilemma, but only observes the behaviour of other 
participants, and then decide whether to punish them or not.  
 
 
 
 
7.1.2. Measures of positive reciprocity 
 
Positive reciprocity refers to situations in which one person can pay a cost to increase the 
payoff of a decision maker in response to a choice made by the decision-maker. The standard 
ways to measure positive reciprocity are through the Trust Game (player 2) and through 
social dilemmas followed by a rewarding phase. 
 
 
 
 
7.1.2.1. Second-party rewarding 
 
There are two standard ways to measure second-party rewarding. The first one is through the 
second mover in the trust game. In this game, Player 1, the investor, has to decide whether to 
transfer a sum of money to Player 2, the investee. Any amount invested is multiplied by a 
factor greater than 1 (typically equal to 3) and given to the investee. The investee has to 
decide how much, if any, to return to the investor. Therefore, returning money corresponds to 
paying a cost (equal to the amount returned) to increase the payoff of the investor. 
 
The other standard way to measure second-party rewarding is through a social dilemma 
followed by a rewarding-stage, in which players can pay a cost to increase each other’s 
payoff in response to the social dilemma interaction. 
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7.1.2.2. Third-party rewarding 
 
Third-party rewarding differs from second-party rewarding in that the rewarder does not play 
the social dilemma, but only observes it. 
 
 
 
 
7.1.3. Measures of expectations of reciprocity 
 
The complementary notion of reciprocity is expectation of reciprocity, situations in which 
one person makes a decision knowing that someone else will have the chance to respond to 
this choice, by punishing it or rewarding it. Expectations of reciprocity can be measured 
through the ultimatum game (player 1), the trust game (player 1), and social dilemmas 
followed by a punishment or rewarding stage. 
 
 
 
 
7.2. Review of the empirical evidence on negative reciprocity 
 
Several studies have explored the effect of time constraints on ultimatum game rejection 
rates. The empirical evidence consistently showed that time pressure makes responders more 
likely to reject low offers. Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003) found that responders under a 20 
seconds time pressure are more likely to reject low offers, compared to participants with a 
100 seconds time delay. Symmetrically, Grimm and Mengel (2011) found that a 10 minutes 
time delay leads participants to accept lower offers, compared to the baseline condition, with 
no time constraint. A similar result was obtained by Wang et al (2011), who found that a 5-
minute time delay decreases rejections of low offers, compared to baseline. These findings 
have been conceptually replicated respectively by Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2011), who 
found that a 30 seconds time pressure increases rejection rates compared to a time delay of 
180 seconds, and by Neo, Yu, Weber and Gonzalez (2013), who found that a 15-minute time 
delay decreases rejection rates of low offers, compared to the baseline with no time 
constraint. More recently, scholars have started exploring the effect of potential moderators. 
For example, Ferguson, Maltby, Bibby and Lawrence (2014) found that whether rejection 
rates are intuitive or deliberative depends on the offer: for the mildly unfair offer (60:40), 
time delay favours rejection; for the unfairer offers (90:10), (80:20), and (70:30), time delay 
has no effect on rejection rates. Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2015) found that a 24-hour 
cooling off period decreases the rejection rate of UG unfair offers, but only when the offers 
were made using lottery tickets, and not when they were made using cash. 
 
 
I am aware of only one study using conceptual primes to manipulate cognitive process among 
ultimatum game responders. Interestingly, its results contrast those obtained using time 
constraints. Indeed, Hochman, Ayal and Ariely (2015) found that asking responders to 
choose following their gut feelings increases the acceptance rate of unfair offers, compared to 
when they are asked to thoroughly consider the available information.  
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Two studies have instead explored the effect of cognitive load on ultimatum game rejection 
rates. Both of these studies found no effect (Cappelletti et al, 2011; Olschewski, Rieskamp 
and Scheibehenne, 2018). Relevant is also the work of Duffy and Smith (2014), who 
explored the evolution of cooperation in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma played under 
cognitive load and compared it with the one under no load. They found that the behaviour of 
people under cognitive load converges to the Nash equilibrium at a slower rate than the 
behaviour of people under low load. Interpreting defection in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
as a form of punishment, this finding is in line with the view that people under high cognitive 
load punish less than those under low load.  
 
Numerous studies have investigated the effect of ego-depletion on UG rejection rates. An 
earlier series of works explored the effect on UG responders of depleting or enhancing 
serotonin, a neurotransmitter implicated in self-control (Carver, Johnson & Joormann, 2008). 
Crockett et al. (2008) found that participants with depleted levels of serotonin rejected a 
greater proportion of unfair but not fair offers. The fact that serotonin depletion is associated 
to punishment in the ultimatum game has been also replicated by Crockett et al. (2010a). 
Symmetrically, Crockett et al. (2010b) found that enhancing serotonin makes participants less 
likely to reject unfair offers. Consistent with this line of research, Anderson and Dickinson 
(2010) found that a night of sleep deprivation increases the minimum acceptable offer among 
ultimatum game responders; Morewedge, Krishnamurti and Ariely (2014) found that alcohol 
intoxication makes participants more likely to reject low offers; Halali, Bereby-Meyer and 
Meiran (2014) found that participants depleted through a Stroop task were more likely to 
reject low offers, a finding that has been also replicated by Liu, He and Dou (2015). There 
are, however, also some works pointing towards the opposite direction: Achtziger, Alós-
Ferrer and Wagner (2016) found that depleting responders through an e-crossing task makes 
them more likely to accept low offers in the first round of a sequence of ultimatum games 
with random re-matching after every round. In a subsequent work, the same authors found no 
effect of depleting responders through an e-crossing task (Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer & Wagner, 
2018). Finally, Clark and Dickinson (2017) found that sleep deprived participants do not 
punish more than well-rested participants after a public goods game.  
 
There have been also numerous papers exploring the effect of neurostimulation of the 
DLPFC on ultimatum game rejection rates. Knoch et al. (2006) found that disruption of the 
rDLPFC (but not of the lDLPFC) by transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces rejection rates 
in the UG. Interestingly, in their experiment, UG responders still judged low offers to be 
unfair, but they were unable to reject them. Knoch et al. (2008) found a similar result by 
disrupting the rDLPFC using cathodal transcranial direct current stimulation, compared to 
sham. They concluded that the rDLPFC plays a decisive role to overcome the prepotent, 
selfish, impulse of accepting any offer. A similar conclusion was obtained by Baumgartner, 
Knoch, Hotz, Eisenegger and Fehr (2011), who found that disrupting the rDLPFC via 
transcranial magnetic stimulation made responders more likely to accept low offers, 
compared to disruption of the lDLPFC.  
 
As for other third-party punishment, Wang et al (2011) implemented a trust game followed 
by third party punishment. They found that a 150 seconds time delay decreases punishment, 
compared to a 30 seconds time pressure. Consistent with this finding, Liu et al (2015) 
implemented an ultimatum game with a third party whose role is to punish proposers. In 
doing so, they found that depleted third-parties are more willing to punish unfair offers. In 
contrast with these findings, however, Buckholtz et al. (2015) found that disrupting the 
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DLPFC via transcranial magnetic stimulation has, compared to sham, the effect of decreasing 
the rate of punishment of norm-transgressors in hypothetical scenarios. Yudkin, Rothmund, 
Twardawski, Thalla and Van Bavel (2016) found that cognitively loaded participants punish 
out-group members more severely than in-group members. Artavia-Mora, Bedi and Rieger 
(2017) found that time delay, compared to time pressure, does not affect third-party 
punishment in a field experiment in which participants had the possibility of withholding help 
(by not returning a lost glove) from someone who had litter. 
 
Finally, there is also one paper exploring the effect basis of anti-social punishment. 
Pfattheicher, Keller and Knezevic (2017) found that conceptual priming of intuition, 
compared to baseline, increased antisocial punishment in a series of one-shot public goods 
games followed by a punishment stage. In a subsequent study published in the same paper, 
Pfattheicher and colleagues also found that inhibiting intuition, compared to baseline, 
decreased antisocial punishment. The same results were not found when activating or 
inhibiting deliberation. These results provide a first piece of evidence suggesting that 
antisocial punishment is driven by the intuitive system. 
 
 
Negative reciprocity 
Second-party punishment 
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Sutter et al. (2003) UG responder Pressure increases rejection of low offers, 
compared to Delay 
Cappelletti et al. (2011) UG responder Pressure increases rejection of low offers, 
compared to Delay 
Grimm & Mengel (2011) UG responder Delay decreases rejection of low offers, 
compared to Baseline 
Wang et al. (2011) UG responder Delay decreases rejection of low offers, 
compared to Baseline 
Neo et al. (2013)  UG responder Delay decreases rejection of low offers, 
compared to Baseline 
Ferguson et al. (2014) UG responder Delay, compared to baseline, decreases rejection 
rates of mildly unfair offers (60:40), leaving the 
rejection rates of unfairer offers unaffected  
Oechssler et al. (2015) UG responder Delay, compared to baseline, decreases 
rejections rates when offers are made using 
lottery tickets and not when using cash 
Conceptual prime studies   
Hochman et al. (2015) UG responder Intuition decreases rejection rates, compared to 
Deliberation 
Cognitive load studies   
Cappelletti et al. (2011) UG responder Load has no effect on rejection of low offers 
Duffy & Smith (2014) Iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma 
Load decreases speed of convergence to Nash 
equilibrium 
Olschewski et al. (2018)  UG responder Load has no effect on rejection of low offers 
Ego depletion studies   
Anderson & Dickinson (2010) UG responder Sleep restriction increases minimum acceptable 
offers  
 43 
Crockett et al. (2008) UG responder Serotonin depletion increases rejection rates of 
unfair offers 
Crockett et al. (2010a) UG responder Serotonin depletion increases rejection rates of 
unfair offers 
Crockett et al. (2010b) UG responder Enhancing serotonin decreases rejection rates of 
unfair offers 
Halali et al. (2014) UG responder Ego depletion increases rejection of low offers 
Morewedge et al. (2014) UG responder Alcohol intoxication increases rejection of low 
offers 
Liu et al. (2015) UG responder Ego depletion increases rejection of low offers 
Achtziger et al. (2016) UG responder Ego depletion decreases rejection of low offers 
Clark & Dickinson (2017) public goods game with 
punishment 
Sleep restriction has no effect on punishment 
Achtziger et al. (2018) UG responder Ego depletion has no effect on rejection of low 
offers 
Neurostimulation studies   
Knoch et al. (2006) UG responder Disruption of rDLPFC decreases rejection of 
low offers, compared to disruption of lDLPFC 
Knoch et al. (2008) UG responder Disruption of rDLPFC decreases rejection of 
low offers, compared to sham 
Baumgartner et al. (2011) UG responder Disruption of rDLPFC decreases rejection of 
low offers, compared to disruption of lDLPFC 
Third party punishment 
Time constraint studies   
Wang et al. (2011) Trust game with 
punishment 
Pressure increases punishment compared to 
Delay 
Artavia-Mora et al. (2017)  Field experiment 
(withholding help from a 
norm violator) 
Pressure has no effect on punishment, compared 
to Delay 
Cognitive load studies   
Yudkin et al. (2016) Steal game followed by 
punishment stage 
Load makes people punish outgroup members 
more severely than ingroup members 
Ego depletion studies   
Liu et al. (2015) UG followed by 
punishment stage 
Ego depletion increases punishment of unfair 
offers 
Neurostimulation studies   
Buckholtz et al. (2015) Punishment of norm 
violators in hypothetical 
scenarios 
Disruption DLPFC decreases punishment, 
compared to sham 
Anti-social punishment 
Conceptual prime studies   
Pfattheicher et al. (2017) public goods game 
followed by punishment 
stage 
Intuition increases anti-social punishment, 
compared to Baseline. Inhibiting Intuition 
decreases anti-social punishment, compared to 
Baseline. 
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7.3. Review of the empirical evidence on positive reciprocity 
 
Two studies explored the cognitive underpinnings of positive reciprocity using time 
constraints. Neo et al. (2013) found no effect of a 15-minute time delay (compared to 
baseline) on the amount returned in the trust game. However, Cabrales et al. (2017) found 
that time delay increases return rates in the trust game. 
 
I am aware of only one work using conceptual primes. Urbig et al. (2015) found that foreign 
language context (Dutch students talking English) make people more likely to not reciprocate 
others’ contribution in a sequential public goods game, suggesting that deliberation impairs 
positive reciprocity. 
 
Three experiments used ego-depletion tasks. Halali et al. (2014) found that depleted 
participants return more than non-depleted ones. The authors obtained this result with two 
different ego-depletion manipulations, a Stroop task and an e-hunting task. In contrast to this 
view, Dickinson and McElroy (2017) found that sleep restriction decreases trustworthiness in 
the trust game. Yet, Rantapuska et al. (2017) found that hunger does not affect 
trustworthiness. 
 
Finally, one paper used neurostimulation. Knoch, Schneider, Schunk, Hohmann and Fehr 
(2009) found that disrupting the rLPFC via transcranial magnetic stimulation has the effect of 
decreasing the amount returned in the trust game, especially when future investors can 
observe investees’ choices. The authors interpreted this finding as a piece of evidence that, in 
order to return money in the trust game, investees have to overcome a selfish impulse to keep 
the whole amount given to them by investors.  
 
 
Positive reciprocity 
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Neo et al. (2013) Trust game investee Delay has no effect on return rates, compared to 
Baseline 
Cabrales et al. (2017) Trust game investee Delay increases return rates 
Conceptual primes studies   
Urbig et al. (2015) Sequential public goods 
game 
Second language decreases reciprocation of high 
contributions 
Ego depletion studies   
Halali et al. (2014) Trust game investee Ego depletion increases return rates 
Dickinson & McElroy (2017) Trust game investee Sleep restriction decreases return rates 
Rantapuska et al. (2017) Trust game investee Hunger has no effect on return rates 
Neurostimulation studies   
Knoch et al. (2009) Trust game investee Disrupting rLPFC decreases return rates 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4. Review of the empirical evidence on expectations of negative reciprocity 
 
 45 
To the best of my knowledge, only one study used time constraints. Cappelletti, Güth and 
Ploner (2011) found that a 15-second time pressure increased proposers’ offers, compared to 
a 180-second time window.  
 
However, there have been several studies using ego depletion. Halali et al. (2013) found that 
ego-depletion increased the proportion of fair UG offers. They also showed that this effect 
was driven by strategic considerations, as the same increase was not observed in dictator 
game giving. Similarly, Morewedge, Krishnamurti and Ariely (2014) found that alcohol 
intoxication does not affect UG offers. Along these lines, Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer and Wagner 
(2016) found that depleted proposers offered more than non-depleted ones, and that this 
effect was driven by fear to be rejected. Clark and Dickinson (2017) found weak evidence 
that sleep deprived participants contributed to the public good more than well-rested 
participants, when they knew that the contribution phase will be followed by a punishment 
phase. Finally, Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer and Wagner (2018) found that depleted proposers are 
more selfish than non-depleted ones.  
 
Finally, two studies used neurostimulation. Ruff et al. (2013) used anodal and cathodal 
transcranial direct current stimulation to either promote or impair the rLPFC during a 
voluntary donation in which the opponent can punish the donor (dictator game with a 
punishment option). In doing so, they found that increasing the activity in the rLPFC 
increased donations, while decreasing the activity in the rLPFC decreased donations. This 
result was replicated by Strang et al. (2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
Expectations of negative reciprocity  
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Cappelletti et al. (2011) Ultimatum game proposer High pressure (15s) increases offers, compared 
to Low pressure (180s) 
Ego depletion studies   
Halali et al. (2013) Ultimatum game proposer Depletion increases proportion of fair offers 
Morewedge et al. (2014) Ultimatum game proposer Alcohol intoxication has no effect on offers 
Achtziger et al. (2016)  Ultimatum game proposer Depletion increases offers 
Clark & Dickinson (2017) Public goods game 
followed by punishment 
phase 
Sleep restriction weakly increases contributions 
Achtziger et al. (2018)  Ultimatum game proposer Depletion decreases offers 
Neurostimulation studies   
Ruff et al. (2013) Dictator game followed by 
punishment stage 
Disrupting LPFC decreases donations; 
Stimulating LPFC increases donations 
Strang et al. (2015). Dictator game followed by 
punishment stage 
Disrupting rDLPFC decreases donations, 
compared to sham. 
 
 
 
 
7.5. Review of the empirical evidence on expectations of positive reciprocity 
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Two studies used time constraints. Neo et al. (2013) found no effect of a 15-minute time 
delay on the amount sent by the investor in the trust game. Jaeger et al. (in press) found that a 
5 seconds time pressure, compared to a 10 seconds time delay, increases investments in the 
trust game. 
 
Four studies explored the effect of ego depletion. Anderson and Dickinson (2010) found that 
a night of sleep deprivation reduced trust in the trust game. This result was also replicated in 
a subsequent work (Dickinson & McElroy, 2017). Consistent with this view, Ainsworth, 
Baumeister, Ariely and Vohs (2014) found that ego-depletion decreases trust. Rantapuska et 
al. (2017) found that hunger does not affect trust.  
 
Two studies used cognitive load. Samson and Kostyszyn (2015) found that cognitive load 
(implemented in two different ways: disturbing noise and memorising a sequence of 
characters) decreased trust in the trust game. In contrast to this result, Bonnefon, Hopfensitz 
and De Neys (2013) found that cognitive load does not interact with capacity to detect 
trustworthiness, suggesting that trust is, in fact, intuitive.  
 
Finally, I am aware of only one study using conceptual primes of intuition. Urbig et al. 
(2015) conducted a sequential 3-player public goods game where two players independently 
act as first movers and the third player can condition their choice on the first two 
contributions. Therefore, first mover choices can be considered as a measure of trust. In 
doing so, Urbig et al. (2015) found no effect on trust of speaking in a second language 
(English for Dutch people) compared to speaking in the first language (Dutch for Dutch 
people).  
 
 
Expectations of positive reciprocity  
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Neo et al. (2013) Trust game investor Delay has no effect on trust 
Jaeger et al. (in press) Trust game investor Pressure increases trust compared to Delay 
Ego depletion studies   
Anderson & Dickinson (2010) Trust game investor Sleep deprivation decreases trust 
Baumeister et al. (2014) Trust game investor Ego depletion decreases trust 
Dickinson & McElroy (2017) Trust game investor Sleep deprivation decreases trust 
Rantapuska et al. (2017) Trust game investor Hunger has no effect on trust 
Cognitive load studies   
Bonnefon et al. (2013) Trust game investor Load has no effect on the capacity to detect 
trustworthiness 
Samson & Kostyszyn (2015) Trust game investor Load decreases trust 
Conceptual prime studies   
Urbig et al. (2015) First mover in sequential 
public goods game 
Second language has no effect on trust 
 
 
 
 
7.6. Outlook and open problems 
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As reviewed above, the evidence regarding the effect of cognitive process on negative 
reciprocity is quite mixed and it even seems to depend on the cognitive manipulation. More 
precisely, virtually all studies using time constraints and ego depletion report a positive effect 
of intuition on both second- and third-party punishment; in contrast, all three 
neurostimulation studies point towards the opposite result, suggesting that the DLPFC is 
necessary for the implementation of punishment. Finally, conceptual primes and cognitive 
load led inconclusive results. At this stage, therefore, I think that it would be conduct more 
studies and/or meta-regressing the current studies to have a better understanding of the 
potential moderating role of cognitive manipulation. This is an important question also from 
a theoretical point of view. If it was confirmed that neurostimulation of the DLPFC works 
fundamentally differently than the other cognitive manipulations, this would be highly 
problematic for the dual-process models and their methodological procedures. I will elaborate 
more on this in Section 10.  
 
Open problem. To conduct more studies and/or to meta-regress the current studies exploring 
the moderating role of cognitive manipulation on the effect of intuition and deliberation on 
negative reciprocity. 
 
Regarding positive reciprocity, as reviewed above, the results are very split. This might 
provide a first piece of evidence that there is no overall effect. However, since there are only 
seven studies on the topic, more evidence and a formal meta-analysis are needed to draw 
general conclusions. 
 
Open problem. To conduct more studies on the cognitive basis of positive reciprocity. 
 
Studies exploring the cognitive basis of expectations of negative reciprocity appear to depend 
on the cognitive manipulation in a similar fashion as those exploring the cognitive basis of 
negative reciprocity. Specifically, time pressure and ego-depletion studies tend to point 
towards a positive role of intuition, such that intuition makes people more pro-social when 
they know that they might be punished. This mirrors perfectly the previous finding that 
intuition promotes negative reciprocity in virtually all studies using time pressure and ego 
depletion. However, in the domain of neurostimulation, as in the case of negative reciprocity, 
the opposite seems to happen: intuition seems to make people less pro-social. This potential 
reversal of the causal effect between cognitive manipulation and punishment depending on 
the cognitive process manipulation suggests that neurostimulation on one hand and time 
constraints and ego depletion on the other hand work fundamentally differently at least in the 
case of second- and third-party punishment. As I mentioned before, to confirm this with more 
studies and formal meta-analyses is a key direction for future research, which can have a 
fundamental theoretical impact on dual-process theories. 
 
Open problem. To conduct more studies and/or to meta-regress the current studies exploring 
the moderating role of cognitive manipulation on the effect of intuition and deliberation on 
expectations of negative reciprocity. 
 
Another interesting question regards the potential moderator role of gender in determining 
the cognitive basis of (expectations of) positive reciprocity. Indeed, while previous research 
find no evidence of gender differences in negative reciprocity (Solnik, 2001; Croson & 
Gneezy, 2009), the evidence regarding positive reciprocity and, in particular, trust game 
behaviour, seems to converge on the finding that men trust more than women, although they 
are equally trustworthy (Buchan, Croson & Solnick, 2008; Dittrich, 2015). This might 
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suggest that there is an interaction between gender and cognitive process, at least in the case 
of expectations of positive reciprocity.  
 
Open problem. Exploring the interaction between gender and cognitive manipulation, at least 
in the case of expectations of positive reciprocity. 
 
 
 
 
8. The cognitive basis of deontology and act utilitarianism 
 
Humans are constantly confronted with choices that have explicit moral dimensions. How to 
guide choices in these situations have intrigued philosophers and psychologists for centuries, 
leading to two main traditions: consequentialism and deontology. Consequentialist judgments 
are those that are in line with moral theories according to which the rightness or wrongness of 
an action depends only on its consequences. A popular consequentialist theory is act 
utilitarianism, according to which “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (Mill, 1863; Bentham 
1789/1983). Act utilitarianism can be logically rejected in many ways. The main non-
utilitarian theory discussed in contemporary research is “deontology”. Broadly speaking, a 
deontological moral theory states that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on 
whether it fulfils certain moral norms, rules, or duties, independently of the consequences 
that this action brings about (e.g., Kant, 1797/2002). Numerous works in the last two decades 
have explored the cognitive underpinnings of deontology and act utilitarianism. 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Measures of the conflict between deontology and act utilitarianism 
 
 
 
 
8.1.1. Sacrificial moral dilemmas 
 
Classically, the conflict between deontology and act utilitarianism has been measured using 
sacrificial moral dilemmas, hypothetical scenario in which one person has to judge whether it 
is morally right to sacrifice one person to save a greater number of people. One example, 
considered, among others, in Greene et al.’s (2001) pioneering work on the cognitive 
underpinnings of moral judgments is the “footbridge dilemma”. This dilemma is typically 
presented to participants as follows: “A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be 
killed if it proceeds on its present course. You are standing next to a large stranger on a 
footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and five people. The only 
way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. The 
stranger will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. 
Should you save the five others by pushing the large man off the footbridge?” 
 
 
 
8.1.2. The process dissociation approach 
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A somewhat similar approach was proposed by Conway and Gawronski (2013), based on the 
Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation procedure. The starting observation of Conway and 
Gawronski (2013) is that classical sacrificial dilemmas treat deontology and act utilitarianism 
as if they were inversely related. Imagine the footbridge dilemma: selecting the deontological 
option coincides with rejecting the utilitarian option; conversely, selecting the utilitarian 
option coincides with rejecting the deontological option. This is inconsistent for example 
with the literature showing that participants experience high conflict when facing some moral 
dilemmas (Greene et al, 2001; Greene, 2007; Koenigs et al, 2007), suggesting that these two 
moral inclinations are not inversely related (otherwise they would not be in conflict), but they 
are operating at the same time. This also creates problems with regard the cognitive 
underpinnings of moral judgments: suppose one finds that a given cognitive manipulation 
makes people more likely to sacrifice the large man in the footbridge dilemma, it is 
impossible to say whether this cognitive manipulation has decreased deontological 
inclinations, or has increased utilitarian inclinations.  
Conway and Gawronski (2013) suggested one way to overcome this limitation. The key idea 
of their procedure is to compare answers on incongruent dilemmas (i.e., moral dilemmas in 
which the deontological and the utilitarian responses are misaligned) with answers on 
congruent dilemmas (i.e., moral dilemmas in which the deontological and the utilitarian 
responses are aligned). For example, the footbridge dilemma is incongruent, because pushing 
the large man off the bridge is acceptable according to the utilitarian perspective, but it is not 
according to a deontological perspective. An example of congruent dilemma is torturing a 
person to prevent a harmless paint bomb from exploding. By comparing answers in 
congruent versus incongruent dilemmas, the relative influence of deontological and utilitarian 
inclinations can be computed algebraically. In doing so, Conway and Gawronski (2013) 
found that deontology and (act) utilitarianism are indeed dissociable: while both inclinations 
were correlated to moral identity, deontological inclinations were associated to empathic 
concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were associated 
to need for cognition. 
 
 
 
 
8.1.3. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale 
 
Guy Kahane and colleagues (Kahane & Shackel, 2010; Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al, 2015; 
Kahane et al, 2018) recently asserted that sacrificial dilemmas are limited in that they 
measure only one dimension of utilitarianism and, arguably, the least important one. Their 
claim originates from Peter Singer’s (1979) observation that the core dimension of act 
utilitarianism is commitment to impartial beneficence, that is, the moral requirement that one 
must promote the greater good of all human beings in a radically impartial way, without 
regard to physical, emotional, or relational distance between the actor and the beneficiary. 
Following this idea, Kahane et al. (2018) introduced, refined, and validated a two-
dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, with both instrumental harm (IH) and impartial 
beneficence (IB) dimensions. The scale consists of nine short statements, five in the IH 
dimension and four in the IB dimension. Kahane et al. (2018) showed that these two 
dimensions are psychologically independent: empathic concern, identification with all 
humanity, and concern for future generations were found to be positively correlated with IB, 
but negatively correlated with IH. These correlations also imply that the two dimensions 
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proposed by Kahane et al. (2018) do not map exactly onto those proposed by Conway and 
Gawronski (2013). 
 
The nine OUS statements are below. Answers are collected using a 7-item Likers scales from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
OUS_IB1. If the only way to save another person’s life during an emergency is to sacrifice 
one’s own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice.  
OUS_IH1. It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary 
means to helping several other innocent people.  
OUS_IB2. From a moral point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a 
person with kidney failure since we don’t need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to 
be healthy.  
OUS_IH2. If the only way to ensure the overall well-being and happiness of the people is 
through the use of political oppression for a short, limited period, then political oppression 
should be used.  
OUS_IB3. From a moral perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human 
beings on the planet equally; they should not favour the well-being of people who are 
especially close to them either physically or emotionally.  
OUS_IH3. It is permissible to torture an innocent person if this would be necessary to 
provide information to prevent a bomb going off that would kill hundreds of people.  
OUS_IB4. It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to actively harm them yourself. 
OUS_IH4. Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to die as collateral 
damage—if more people are saved overall.  
OUS_IB5. It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate it 
to causes that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal. 
 
 
 
8.2. Review of the empirical evidence 
 
A number of papers have explored the cognitive underpinnings of deontological vs utilitarian 
judgments using sacrificial moral dilemmas. These works provide converging evidence that 
intuition favours deontological decisions. Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) found that a 
positive emotion induction made participants more likely than control participants to sacrifice 
the large man in the footbridge dilemma. In line with this research, Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom and Cohen (2008) found that cognitive load selectively interfered with 
utilitarian judgments, by making them slower. Suter and Hertwig (2011) found that an 8-
second time pressure increased deontological judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas, 
compared to a 3-minute time delay. Additionally, Suter and Hertwig (2011) replicated their 
result using, instead of time pressure, conceptual primes in which participants were instructed 
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to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. Cummins and Cummins (2012) found that time 
pressure reduced the proportion of utilitarian judgments in eighteen sacrificial moral 
dilemmas. Trémolière, De Neys and Bonnefon (2012) found that ego-depletion (implemented 
by mortality salience) increased deontological judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. Kvaran, 
Nichols and Sanfey (2013) found that participants primed to think analytically made more 
utilitarian choices than control participants, whereas emotional primes made participants to 
make less utilitarian choices. Trémolière and Bonnefon (2014) found that time pressure 
increased deontological choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas, but only when the save/kill 
ratio was relatively small (five), but not when it was large (five hundreds), suggesting that 
efficient save/kill ratio can make people more utilitarian, and utilitarian judgments more 
accessible. They found the same result with cognitive load at the place of time pressure. 
Spears, Fernández-Linsenbarth, Okan, Ruz and González (2018) manipulated participants 
cognitive processes presenting dilemmas using an easy-to-read versus hard-to-read font. In 
doing so, they found that participants in the hard-to-read-font condition were more likely to 
endorse utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. Timmons and Byrne (2018) used an 
ego-depletion task similar to the e-crossing task and found that depleted participants tended 
to be more deontological than non-depleted ones in sacrificial moral dilemmas. 
 
Therefore, research consistently showed that promoting intuition favours deontological 
judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas. Is this effect driven by a reduction of utilitarian 
inclinations or by a strengthen of deontological intuitions? Two papers using the process 
dissociation approach procure converging evidence that intuition reduces utilitarian 
judgments: Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that cognitive load selectively reduced 
utilitarian judgments, while leaving deontological inclinations unaffected; Li, Xia, Wu and 
Chen (2018) found that a combination of conceptual priming of intuition and cognitive load 
decreased utilitarian inclinations, while leaving deontological inclinations unaffected.13 
 
I am aware of only one study exploring the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgments 
using the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. Capraro, Everett and Earp (2019) found that priming 
intuition increases non-utilitarian judgments in the instrumental harm dimension, but not in 
the impartial beneficence dimension. 
 
Utilitarian judgments 
 Dependent variable Main result 
Time constraint studies   
Suter & Hertwig (2011) Sacrificial dilemmas Pressure increases deontological choices 
Cummins & Cummins (2012) Sacrificial dilemmas Pressure increases deontological choices 
Trémolière & Bonnefon (2014) Sacrificial dilemmas with 
varying save/kill ratio 
Pressure increases deontological choices for 
save/kill = 5 but not save/kill = 500 
Cognitive load studies   
Greene et al. (2008) Sacrificial dilemmas Load increases response time of utilitarian 
choices 
Trémolière & Bonnefon (2014) Sacrificial dilemmas with 
varying save/kill ratio 
Load increases deontological choices for 
save/kill = 5 but not save/kill = 500 
Conway and Gawronski (2013) Sacrificial dilemmas using 
process dissociation 
Load reduces utilitarian judgments, while 
leaving deontological judgments unaffected 
                                               
13A recent correlational paper argues that different types of reflection may determine different moral tendencies, 
with arithmetic reflection being correlated with utilitarian judgments and logical reflection being correlated with 
both utilitarian and deontological judgments (Byrd & Conway, in press).  
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Li et al. (2018) Sacrificial dilemmas using 
process dissociation 
Load reduces utilitarian judgments, while 
leaving deontological judgments unaffected 
Conceptual primes studies   
Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) Sacrificial dilemmas Affect induction increases deontological choices 
Kvaran et al. (2013) Sacrificial dilemmas Emotional prime increases deontological choices 
Analytical prime increases utilitarian choices 
Spears et al. (2018)  Sacrificial dilemmas Attention prime increases utilitarian choices 
Capraro et al. (2019) Oxford Utilitarianism Scale Priming intuition increases non-utilitarian 
judgments in the instrumental harm dimension, 
but not in the impartial beneficence dimension 
Ego depletion studies   
Trémolière et al. (2012) Sacrificial dilemmas Depletion increases deontological choices 
Timmons & Byrne (2018) Sacrificial dilemmas Depletion increases deontological choices 
 
 
 
 
 
8.3. Outlook and open problems 
 
As just reviewed, there is large and consistent evidence that System 1 promotes deontological 
decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas, and two additional studies suggest that this effect is 
driven by a reduction of utilitarian inclinations, rather than a strengthen of deontological 
ones. On the other hand, only one study explored the effect of cognitive manipulations on 
judgments using the OUS: Capraro et al. (2019) found that conceptual priming of intuition 
favours non-utilitarian judgments in the domain of instrumental harm but not in the domain 
of impartial beneficence. One limitation of this work is that it manipulates cognitive process 
by means of explicit conceptual primes of intuition and deliberation, which have been 
criticized as they can generate potential demand effects, such that participants respond 
according on how they believe they should respond (Rand, 2016; Kvarven et al., 2019). 
Therefore, more studies are needed on the topic, possibly using cognitive manipulations other 
than conceptual primes.  
 
Open problem. Exploring the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgments in the OUS 
dilemmas using cognitive manipulations other than conceptual primes. 
 
A major open question regards whether real moral dilemmas have the same cognitive basis of 
hypothetical moral dilemmas. Experimenting on real dilemmas is difficult for obvious ethical 
reasons. However, very recently, Bostyn, Sevenhant and Roets (2018) explored decisions in 
real-life moral dilemmas using electroshocks (which participants did not know they were 
bogus) to be administered to one vs five mice. Surprisingly, Bostyn et al (2018) found that 
moral judgments in classical hypothetical moral dilemmas are not predictive of behaviour in 
real-life dilemmas, but “they are predictive of affective and cognitive aspects of the real-life 
decision”. This result raises a major question. What are the cognitive underpinnings of 
deontology and act utilitarianism in real-life moral dilemmas? 
 
Open problem. Exploring the underpinnings of deontology and act utilitarianism in real-life 
moral dilemmas. 
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Another interesting question regards potential gender differences in the cognitive basis of 
moral judgments. There is indeed evidence that women differ from men in moral judgments 
in the instrumental harm dimension (Capraro & Sippel, 2017; Friesdorf, Conway & 
Gawronski, 2015; Fumagalli et al., 2010). Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether 
there are gender differences in the cognitive underpinnings of utilitarianism. 
 
Open problem: Exploring potential gender differences in the cognitive basis of deontology 
and act utilitarianism. 
 
 
 
 
9. The General Social Heuristics Hypothesis (GSHH) 
 
The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) has been originally introduced by Rand and 
colleagues (Rand et al, 2014), in the domain of cooperative behaviour, to explain their 
finding that intuition promotes cooperation in one-shot, anonymous, social dilemmas. Using 
their original words, the SHH contends that “cooperation is typically advantageous in 
everyday life, leading to the formation of generalized cooperative intuitions. Deliberation, by 
contrast, adjusts behaviour towards the optimum for a given situation. Thus, in one-shot 
anonymous interactions where selfishness is optimal, intuitive responses tend to be more 
cooperative than deliberative responses”. More recently, the SHH has been adapted to other 
behavioural domains, such as altruism (Rand et al., 2016), honesty (Capraro, 2017), and 
reciprocity (Hallsson et al., 2018).  
 
However, there is no formal model of the SHH and its generalizations, apart from a few 
exceptions that considered models for the evolution of cooperation among dual-process 
individuals (Bear & Rand, 2016; Bear, Kagan & Rand, 2017, Jagau & Van Veelen, 2018; 
Mosleh & Rand, 2018). However, being focused on cooperative behaviour, these models, 
although interesting, are of limited applicability. Therefore, the development of a general 
framework would be very desirable at this stage. The lack of a unified theory limits the 
capacity of the theory to make explicit predictions, which, in turn, limits its falsifiability, 
slows down new developments, and might even result in a replicability crisis (Muthukrishna 
& Henrich, 2019).  
 
The goal of this section is to develop a formal, general framework – inspired to the original 
SHH – that can be applied to potentially every one-shot, anonymous game. (Here I call 
“game” also decision problems with only one decision maker, such as the dictator game).  
 
 
 
 
9.1. Theoretical framework 
 
Let G be a one-shot, anonymous game, with N ³ 1 anonymous players. Individuals that are 
affected by the decisions but do not make any actual decisions (e.g., recipients in the dictator 
game) are also counted among the N players. G needs not be simultaneous. Descriptively, the 
key assumptions of the General Social Heuristics Hypothesis (GSHH) are: 
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GSHH1: System 1 allows people to quickly access useful heuristics that they have 
internalized in those everyday interactions that resemble game G. 
 
GSHH2: System 2 allows people to compute the strategies that maximize the payoff in the 
given, one-shot, anonymous, interaction, and implement one of them, by overriding the 
heuristic suggested by System 1. 
 
To formalize GSHH2 is easy: System 2 pushes people towards a Nash equilibrium of game 
G. To formalize GSHH1 is less easy and one needs to give mathematical sense to the 
informal notion of “everyday interactions that resemble game G”. 
 
Everyday interactions differ from one-shot, anonymous, laboratory interactions in several 
regards. Here, I focus on two crucial points: 
 
(i) Payoff structure. While, in the lab, payoffs are set by the experimenter, in 
everyday interactions they depend on a number of factors that are beyond the 
control of the experimenter. In particular, it is well possible that different people 
develop their heuristics in games that, from the strategic point of view, are 
identical, or very similar, to the original game G, but differ from it from the point 
of view of the payoff structure (e.g., social dilemmas with different cost to benefit 
ratios). 
(ii) Dynamicity. One-shot laboratory experiments are, by construction, one-shot and 
anonymous. Real interactions are different: in reality, after one interaction, people 
can usually decide whether to interact again, or not. 
 
To incorporate these concepts into a formal framework, I use the notion of weak embedding 
of a game into another game, a notion that is closely related to the notion of weak 
isomorphism between games, introduced to describe games that are strategically equivalent, 
but differ from one another for the specific payoffs (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Gabarró, 
García & Serna, 2011). Let G, G’ be two games, with the same number of players and the 
same strategy sets. Let pi,G(s) be the material payoff of player i in game G when the strategy 
profile s is played. I say that G is weakly embeddable into G’ if the following two properties 
are satisfied: 
 
1. whenever s and t are two strategy profiles such that pi,G(s) > pi,G(t), then one has 
pi,G’(s) > pi,G’(t).  
 
Therefore, weak embeddings preserve the order of payoffs, but they do not preserve 
equivalence of payoffs: if pi,G(s) = pi,G(t), it might happen that pi,G’(s) ¹ pi,G’(t).  
 
 
A useful way to look at weak embeddings is by imagining a situation in which G can be 
obtained by G’ by collapsing one or more “secondary dimensions”: two strategy profiles s 
and t that are distinguishable in G, are distinguishable also in G’; however, two strategy 
profiles that are not distinguishable in G, might become distinguishable in G’, thanks to these 
“secondary dimensions”.14 As an explicit example, consider the case of instrumental harm in 
sacrificial dilemmas. The typical lab experiment assumes that the consequences for the 
                                               
14The terminology “secondary dimensions” is more than just a metaphor. Indeed, the simplest example of a 
weak embedding is the standard projection of the n-dimensional real space, endowed with the lexicographic 
order, into its first k-components (with n > k). 
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decision maker when s/he decides to push the large man off the bridge to save the five works 
that are about to be killed by the trolley are equal to the consequences when the decision 
maker decides not to push the large men off the bridge. Therefore, the payoff function of the 
decision maker does not distinguish “pushing the large man off the bridge” from “not 
pushing the large man off the bridge”. However, in reality (e.g., in G’) there are several 
“secondary dimensions”, that are not represented in G, and through which pushing the large 
man might become costly for the decision maker. For example, if a person, in reality, tries to 
harm another person, the person target of the harm would probably react, leading to a fight 
that is likely to cause some harm also to the first person. Another dimension regards a 
potential reputation cost: real actions are typically observed by others, which might judge the 
decision maker badly if observed harming other people. Along these lines, indeed, several 
works have shown that people making deontological judgments are judged better than those 
making utilitarian judgments, along a number of dimensions (Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Everett, 
Pizarro & Crockett, 2016; Rom, Weiss & Conway, 2017; Sacco et al, 2016). 
 
The whole point of weak embeddings is to take into account the existence of these potential 
sources of variation. It is important to note that, while this gives elasticity to the theory, the 
fact that weak embedding preserve the order of payoffs guarantee that, in many cases, the 
predictions of the theory do not depend on G’.  
 
I can now formalize GSHH2. I assume that, under System 1, players do not play G, but they 
play its “real-life analogue”, Greal, defined as follows: 
 
- In the first round, players play a game G’ such that G weakly embeds into G’ 
- At the end of the first round, all decision-makers vote whether to play another round 
of G’ 
- If all the decision-makers vote for playing G’ again, then they play G’, and the game 
starts again. Otherwise the game stops.15 
 
Note that Greal might be an infinite game, if players keep voting to replay G’ after every 
round. Therefore, to guarantee convergence of payoffs in case the game turns out to be 
infinite, I define the payoff of player i at round t to be the payoff of the game, discounted by 
qt. Another important note is that it is not that all players vote whether to play another round, 
but all decision-makers vote to play another round. For example, in the dictator game, only 
the dictator votes whether to play another round.  
 
It is important to note that the particular G’ will, in general, depend on the individual. For 
example, some individuals might have been raised in a society in which cooperation has a 
large benefit, and therefore, when they read the instructions of a prisoner’s dilemma, G, their 
System 1 makes them think automatically about another prisoner’s dilemma, G’, with a large 
benefit to cost ratio. In contrast, other individuals, might have been raised in a society in 
which cooperation has low benefit, and therefore their System 1 makes them think 
automatically about a prisoner’s dilemma, G’, with low benefit to cost ratio. The fact that G’ 
depends on the individual gives elasticity to the theory and allows to explore the role of 
potential individual moderators. At the same time, this elasticity is not so much to affect the 
                                               
15The particular voting rule does not really matter. I use the unanimity rule because, in reality, it seems 
reasonable to assume that another interaction will be played only if all players want to do it. However, it is well 
possible that there are specific situations in which other rules might apply. The general framework does not 
depend on the particular voting rule, although the details of the formal arguments may do.  
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capacity of the theory to make predictions: as I will show later, most of the GSHH 
predictions do not depend G’.  
 
Having said this, I can finally state the GSHH. 
 
The General Social Heuristics Hypothesis (GSHH) contends that System 1 promotes a 
strategy that maximizes the payoff of Greal, while System 2 promotes a strategy that 
maximizes the payoff of G. 
 
 
 
 
9.2. Testing the GSHH on social decisions 
 
In this section, I extrapolate the predictions of the GSHH in all the social decisions 
considered in this review, and I compare them with the empirical findings discussed above. 
 
 
 
 
9.2.1. Cooperation 
 
Assume that G is a one-shot, anonymous, prisoner’s dilemma (the public goods game is 
similar). Let G’ be a game such that G weakly embeds into G’. It is easy to see that G’ is 
itself a prisoner’s dilemma game, because weak embeddings preserve the order of payoffs. 
The only difference is that G’ need not be a symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. Now assume that 
G’ is such that the payoff for mutual cooperation is positive for both players. If so, one of the 
Nash equilibria of Greal is to cooperate at every round and then vote to play another round if 
and only if the other player cooperated in the round before. On the other hand, the only 
strategy that maximizes the payoff in G is defection, being G a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. 
Therefore, the GSHH predicts that the rate of cooperation under System 1 is greater than or 
equal to the rate of cooperation under System 2. This overall prediction has been supported 
by Rand’s (2016), Kvarven et al.’s (2019), and Rand’s (2019) meta-analyses16.  
 
The GSHH makes also predictions about the role of individual-level moderators: people who 
live in a cooperative society (high cost to benefit ratio and positive payoffs for mutual 
cooperation) are more likely than people who live in a non-cooperative society to play the 
cooperative equilibrium of Greal, therefore they are more likely to have internalized the 
cooperative heuristic. This prediction has been supported by two studies (Rand & Kraft-
Todd, 2014; Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
9.2.2. Altruism 
 
                                               
16Note however, that results are more mixed among studies using neurostimulation or patients with brain 
damage, that are not included in these meta-analyses. These studies suggest that activation of the DLPFC has a 
positive effect on cooperation, which is not easily reconcilable with the GSHH. Future work might help clarify 
this point. 
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Assume that G is a one-shot, anonymous, dictator game. Since weak embeddings preserve 
the ordering of the payoffs, then G’ is strategically equivalent to a dictator game. The only 
property that can change is the starting payoffs of the players and the cost to benefit ratio of 
the altruistic action, which need not be 1 in G’, since weak embeddings preserve only orders 
but not distances. From this observation, it follows that the only strategy that maximizes the 
dictator’s payoff in Greal is to be selfish, because her or his payoff can only decrease. Since 
also the strategy that maximizes the dictator’s payoff in G is to be selfish, in the case of the 
dictator game the GSHH predicts that System 1 and System 2 have no effect on altruistic 
behaviour. Two meta-analyses agree on this finding (Rand et al., 2016; Fromell et al., 
2018)17. 
 
 
 
 
9.2.3. Honesty 
 
In the domain of honesty, I distinguish two cases. Since GSHH2 assumes that the key role of 
System 2 is to compute the action that maximizes the payoff in the given interaction, the 
GSHH makes different empirical predictions depending on whether this action is 
communicated to the players before the cognitive manipulation, or not.  
 
Consider a one-shot, anonymous sender-receiver game, G, in which senders are informed that 
lying would increase their payoff at a cost for the receiver, but they are not initially given the 
private information they need to send to the receiver. This piece of information is given only 
at the very beginning, or during, the cognitive manipulation. In this case, players do not 
initially know the payoff maximizing strategy of G and, therefore, there is room for System 1 
to access heuristics developed in Greal. I now show that, in this situation, there exist games G’ 
such that G weakly embeds into G’ and being honest is an equilibrium of the corresponding 
Greal. To demonstrate this, I first note that G’ is a sender-receiver-like game, which differs 
from G only on the specific payoff consequences of lying versus telling the truth, but not on 
the order of the payoffs. This means that, if G is a sender-receiver game in the black lie 
condition, so it is also G’. Now, consider G’ such that the receiver is harmed by the lie, in the 
sense that he receives a negative payoff, whereas the sender is not harmed by telling the truth, 
in the sense that she receives a non-negative payoff. In this situation, if the sender lies at the 
first round of Greal, the receiver might prefer voting to leave the interaction, rather than voting 
to play another round, in order to avoid getting one more negative payoff; on the other hand, 
since the sender is not harmed by telling the truth, she might prefer telling the truth and then 
voting to play another interaction, rather than lying at the first interaction and then stop, 
because the receiver refuses to play another round. In sum, to be honest is among the 
equilibria of Greal. 
 
On the other hand, G has a unique best strategy: to lie. Therefore, the GSHH predicts that the 
rate of honesty under System 1 is greater than or equal to the rate of honesty under System 2. 
This prediction has been supported by three studies (Foerster et al., 2013; Capraro, 2017; 
Capraro et al., 2019).  
 
                                               
17Observe that, although Table 2 seems to suggest that ego-depletion studies trend towards a negative effect of 
ego-depletion on altruism, the overall effect is not significantly different from zero (Fromell et al., 2018). 
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Conversely, when the payoff maximizing strategy in the one-shot deception task is clear and 
evident since before the cognitive manipulation (for example in the standard die-rolling task), 
then the GSHH cannot be applied, because there is no room for System 1 to access heuristics 
to be applied in cases in which the payoff maximizing strategy is not known, exactly because 
the very assumption that the payoff maximizing strategy is not known is not satisfied. It is 
interesting to note that Köbis et al.’s (in press) meta-analysis found that, in this case, 
promoting deliberation increases honesty. This fact is neither in support or against the GSHH. 
It simply concerns a domain in which the GSHH cannot be applied. Understanding whether 
the GSHH can be extended as to include also this case is an important direction for future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
9.2.4. Equity-efficiency trade-off 
 
Let G be a one-shot, anonymous trade-off game (TOG), and let Eq and Ef be, respectively, 
the equitable and the efficient TOG available allocations. If the decision-maker’s payoff in 
Eq is smaller (greater) than its payoff in Ef, then, by definition of weak embedding, the 
decision maker’s payoff in Eq’ is smaller (greater) than its payoff in Ef’, which implies that 
the strategy that maximizes the decision-maker’sa payoff in TOGreal is the same as the one 
that maximizes its payoff in TOG. In other words, in this case the GSHH predicts that 
cognitive manipulations would not affect participant’s choices. If, instead, the decision-
maker’s payoff in Eq is equal to its payoff in Ef, then, the GSHH predicts that, under System 
2, a participant will be indifferent between equity and efficiency, while, under System 1, the 
decision-maker’s payoff maximizing strategy will depend on its payoff in TOG’. Therefore, 
anything can happen depending on whether, in TOG’, equity is costly, convenient, or 
indifferent for the decision-maker.  
 
In other words, the GSHH makes the prediction that the effect of cognitive manipulation on 
the TOG is moderated by the cost or the cost of being equitable in their everyday interactions. 
This is an interesting prediction that could be tested in future experiment. As I reviewed 
above, there is only one causal paper on this topic (Capraro et al., 2017), which found that 
time pressure increases equity, while time delay increases efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
9.2.5. Negative reciprocity 
 
Assume that G is a one-shot, anonymous, ultimatum game (UG). Since weak embeddings 
preserve the ordering of the payoffs, then UG’ is strategically equivalent to an ultimatum 
game, apart from the specific payoffs of the two players. Considers UG’ such that the payoff 
associated to rejection is 0 for both participants (e.g., UG’ = UG). In this case, UGreal admits 
a number of equilibria of the following form: the responder rejects any offer under a certain 
threshold and always vote to play another round of UG’ (even when s/he receives an offer 
smaller than its threshold); the proposer makes an offer equal to the responder’s threshold 
and always vote to play another round of UG’. On the other hand, in the one-shot version, the 
responder’s payoff-maximizing strategy is to accept any offer. Therefore, the GSHH predicts 
that the rate of rejections of low offers under System 1 is greater than or equal to the rate of 
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rejections of low offers under System 2. As reviewed above, studies using time pressure and 
ego-depletion overwhelmingly confirm this prediction. However, studies using conceptual 
primes and cognitive load are inconclusive, while those using neurostimulation seem to point 
towards the opposite conclusion.  
 
Now, consider the same game, the UG, from the point of view of the proposer. A similar line 
of reasoning as above shows that, in UGreal, making a positive offer and then voting to play 
another round is certainly part of the Nash equilibrium in which the responder rejects any 
offer below that positive offer. In contrast, in the one-shot version of the UG, the proposer 
knows that the responder’s payoff maximizing strategy is to accept any offer, therefore the 
proposer’s payoff maximizing strategy is to offer the minimum non-zero offer. In other 
words, the GSHH predicts that offers in the UG under System 1 are greater than or equal to 
the offers under System 2. As reviewed above, this prediction seems to be supported by time 
constraint studies and ego depletion studies, whereas neurostimulation studies seem to point 
towards the opposite direction. No studies have been conducted using conceptual primes and 
cognitive load. 
 
 
 
 
9.2.6. Positive reciprocity 
 
Let G be a one-shot, anonymous, trust game (TG). Since weak embeddings preserve the 
ordering of payoffs, then TG’ differs from TG only on the particular payoffs received by the 
players, and not on the strategic structure. Consider TG’ such that all the payoffs are non-
negative (e.g., TG’ = TG). In this case, TGreal admits the following equilibrium: the investor 
invests the money and then vote to play another round of TG’ if and only if the investee 
returns the money; the investee returns the money and always vote to play another round of 
TG’. By contrast, in the one-shot TG, the only payoff maximizing strategy is to return no 
money. Therefore, the GSHH predicts that return rates in the trust game under System 1 are 
higher than or equal to the return rates under System 2. This prediction does not seem to be 
supported by the data. Seven experiments have been conducted so far, leading to inconclusive 
results: two studies suggest a positive effect of System 1 on return rates, two studies suggest a 
null effect, and three studies suggest a negative effect.  
 
Now, consider the same game, the TG, from the point of view of the investor. A similar line 
of reasoning as above shows that, in TGreal, investing is optimal, because investees have an 
incentive to return money and then vote to stay in the interaction. However, in the one-shot 
version, the investor knows that the investee’s payoff maximizing strategy is to return no 
money, therefore the investor’s payoff maximizing strategy is to invest no money. Therefore, 
the GSHH predicts that System 1 promotes trust, while System 2 inhibits trust. This 
prediction is not supported by the data, which actually trend in the opposite direction. 
 
 
 
 
9.2.7. Deontology vs act utilitarianism 
 
In this section, I would like to apply the GSHH to moral dilemmas. With some exceptions, 
the vast majority of empirical studies on moral dilemmas used hypothetical situations to test 
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which of two conflicting actions people rate to be more morally appropriate. Therefore, moral 
dilemmas regard judgments rather than actual behaviour. Recent research highlights that 
judgments in moral dilemmas might not correspond to actual behaviour (Bostyn et al., 2018; 
FeldmannHall et al., 2012). Therefore, this section should be taken with a grain of salt. 
However, I think it is interesting to see that, under a “reasonable assumption” the GSHH 
makes also predictions regarding moral dilemmas, and these predictions are roughly in line 
with the empirical observations.  
 
In a typical sacrificial dilemma (a moral dilemma in the instrumental harm dimension, in the 
language of Kahane et al., 2018), people have to choose whether to sacrifice one person to 
save a greater number of people from harm. One can approximate this situation by means of 
an economic decision problem G in which the decision maker has to decide between the 
allocation D = (0,0,-1.-1) and the allocation U = (0,-1,0,0), where -1 represents “harm”, 0 
represents “not harm”, and the first component represents the payoff of the decision maker, 
who is assumed to be indifferent between “harming” and “not harming”. The notation D (U) 
stands for Deontological (Utilitarian) choice.  
 
Consider now G’, which is, by definition, a game such that G weakly embeds into G’, and it 
represents the game similar to G that the decision maker usually plays in real life. In reality, 
harming another person often comes with a cost, given simply by the fact that the person 
target of the harm might not like to be harmed, and could fight back, with the consequence of 
harming the decision-maker. Therefore, it seems “reasonable” to assume that, in G’, the 
decision-maker’s payoff in U’ is negative and smaller that its payoff in D’. From this 
“reasonable assumption”, it follows, that, in Greal, the only strategy that maximizes the 
decision-maker’s payoff is the deontological decision, D’. On the other hand, in G, given 
these payoffs, the decision maker is indifferent between the two choices. Therefore, under the 
“reasonable” assumption that, in G’, harming someone else is costly for the decision maker, 
then GSHH predicts that the rate of deontological choices under System 1 is greater than the 
rate of deontological choices under System 2. This prediction is in line with the empirical 
research reviewed above. 
I now move to the dimension of impartial beneficence. In this case, predictions seem less 
obvious. For example, consider the first item of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS): “If 
the only way to save another person’s life during an emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, 
then one is morally required to make this sacrifice.” If we represent this situation with a 
decision problem G in which the decision maker has to choose between two allocations of 
money, (0,-1) and (-1/2,0), it is clear that not sacrificing the leg is the only payoff 
maximizing choice both in G and in G’ (because weak embeddings preserve orders). 
Therefore, in this case, the GSHH predicts that the rate of impartial beneficence under 
System 1 should be the same as the rate of impartial beneficence under System 2 (and it 
should be zero). A similar argument applies to the second item of the OUS (from a moral 
point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a person with kidney 
failure since we don’t need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to be healthy), and 
also to the fifth item (it is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one 
can donate it to causes that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal). Less 
obvious are the predictions regarding the third and the fourth items, that are more abstract 
(from a moral perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human beings on 
the planet equally; they should not favour the well-being of people who are especially close 
to them either physically or emotionally; it is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to 
actively harm them yourself).  
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In any case, it is interesting that, overall, with minimal assumptions on how to represent 
moral dilemmas using economic games, the GSHH makes predictions that are in line with the 
empirical finding that intuition promotes deontological judgments in the IH dimension, but 
not in the IB dimension (Capraro, Everett & Earp, 2019).  
 
Social decision Are the predictions of the General Social Heuristics Hypothesis confirmed? 
  
Cooperation Yes  
Altruism Yes 
Honesty (when players do 
not initially know their 
payoff maximizing strategy) 
Yes 
Honesty (when players do 
initially know their payoff 
maximizing strategy) 
GSHH cannot be applied 
Equity-Efficiency trade-off Inconclusive – but there is only one study  
Negative reciprocity Yes – apart from when cognitive process is manipulated using neurostimulation 
Expectations of negative 
reciprocity 
Yes – apart from when cognitive process is manipulated using neurostimulation 
Positive reciprocity Inconclusive – but there are only seven studies 
Expectations of positive 
reciprocity 
No (opposite effect) 
Instrumental harm Yes – but one has to add one more “reasonable” assumption 
Impartial beneficence Data consistent with the predictions – but there is only one study  
 
 
 
 
9.3. Limitations of the GSHH and directions for future research 
 
In sum, the GSHH is a useful framework that successfully predicts the overall effects of 
System 1 and System 2 on decision-making in a number of behavioural contexts, but not all. 
Here I describe the main limitations of the GSHH. 
The case of honesty is particularly interesting. When players do not initially know the payoff-
maximizing strategy, then System 1 promotes honesty (Foerster et al., 2013; Capraro, 2017; 
Capraro et al., 2019), and this is in line with the predictions of the GSHH. However, when 
players know the available actions and their consequences since before the cognitive process 
manipulation, then System 2 promotes honesty, especially when dishonesty harms an abstract 
other (Köbis et al., in press). This is neither against nor in favour of the GSHH, which simply 
cannot be applied in this case, because there is no room for System 1 to access heuristics. 
However, it is undoubtable that it would be an important direction for future research to try to 
explain the results of Köbis et al. (in press) in terms of a suitable extension of the GSHH.  
The second main limitation of the GSHH regards its precise predictions in the domain of 
altruism and impartial beneficence. In both cases, the GSHH correctly predicts that there is 
no overall effect of System 1 and System 2 on behaviour. However, the GSHH predicts that 
the rate of altruism and impartial beneficence (at least in the OUS items 1, 3 and 5) should be 
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zero. This is not what we see in the experiments. Decades of experimental research have 
shown that a significant proportion of people give part of their endowment in the one-shot, 
anonymous dictator game (Engel, 2011), and this proportion even increases when the benefit 
created is greater than the cost of the altruistic action (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001), a 
behaviour that could be classified as impartial beneficence.  
One could in principle try to overcome these two limitations by assuming that some people 
are not completely selfish and, even after deliberation, think about the good of other people 
(altruism, honesty) or the good of the society as a whole (impartial beneficence). However, it 
remains theoretically challenging how to explain why some of these behaviours seem to 
depend on System 2 (honesty) while others seem to be system-independent (altruism, 
impartial beneficence). Explaining this asymmetry is a fundamental direction for future 
research. 
The third main limitation of the GSHH is that it predicts that System 1 promotes trust, while 
the empirical results point towards the diametrically opposite effect. Is it possible to explain 
this discrepancy? One thing that is worth noticing is that the vast majority of studies 
exploring the cognitive underpinnings of trust used ego-depletion as a mechanism to 
manipulate cognitive process. Ego-depletion does not simply make people more likely to 
adopt System 1, but it also makes them prefer immediate benefit over delayed rewards (Bayer 
& Osher, 2018). This confound is potentially important in the trust game, because, being a 
non-simultaneous game, it contains a conflict between short-term benefit and long-term 
benefit. In line with this interpretation, the two studies using time pressure to measure trust 
seem to point towards a positive effect of System 1 on trust, which would be in line with the 
predictions of the GSHH. Future studies exploring the cognitive basis of trust using 
manipulations other than ego-depletion can clarify this point.   
 
 
10. The case of neurostimulation 
 
Another important open problem regards the relationship between neurostimulation and the 
other cognitive manipulations. As reviewed in the previous sections, in some behavioural 
domains the results obtained using neurostimulation point towards the opposite directions to 
those obtained through the other cognitive manipulations. For example, three meta-analyses 
(Rand, 2016; Kvarven et al., 2019; Rand, 2019) agreed that time pressure, ego depletion, 
conceptual primes of intuition, and cognitive load, all together, promoted cooperative 
behaviour in social dilemmas; by contrast, Li et al. (2018) found that activation of the 
rDLPFC increased cooperation, compared to the sham condition, and that inhibition of the 
rDLPFC decreased cooperation, relative to the sham condition. More worrisomely, the 
majority of studies agreed that promoting System 1 had a positive effect on negative 
reciprocity and on expectations of negative reciprocity; by contrast, all six studies using 
neurostimulation to investigate the cognitive underpinnings of negative reciprocity and 
expectations of negative reciprocity found that inhibiting the DLPFC decreased negative 
reciprocity and expectations of negative reciprocity (Knoch et al., 2006; Knoch et al., 2008; 
Baumgartner et al., 2011; Ruff et al., 2013; Buckholtz et al., 2015; Strang et al., 2015).  
 
One must say that the same reversal of correlation does not seem to be present in the case of 
altruistic behaviour and in the case of honesty. In the case of altruism, two meta-analyses 
(Rand et al., 2016; Fromell et al., 2019) agreed that there is no overall effect of time pressure, 
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ego-depletion, cognitive load, and conceptual primes of intuition, on altruism; consistent with 
this view, the evidence reported in the three studies using neuro-stimulation is mixed (Ruff et 
al., 2013; Strang et al., 2015; Gross et al., 2018). In the case of honesty, Köbis et al.’s (in 
press) meta-analysis found that, when lying harms abstract others, then honesty is 
deliberative, which is the same result reported in the only study using neuro-stimulation 
(Maréchal et al., 2017). In the same meta-analysis, Köbis et al. (in press) found that, when 
lying harms concrete others, then there is no overall effect of System 2 on honesty; somewhat 
consistent with this view, the only study using neurostimulation in the sender-receiver game 
founds that activation of the DLPFC increases honesty, but only for women (Gao et al., 
2018). 
 
It is anyway alarming that in three behavioural domains (cooperation, negative reciprocity, 
expectations of negative reciprocity) neurostimulation of the DLPFC seems to work 
completely different from the other cognitive manipulations. This potential difference is 
problematic and must be investigated more. First of all, since so far there are only seven 
studies using neurostimulation in these domains, and, in particular, only one of them is on 
cooperative behaviour, there is need to conduct more studies using neurostimulation, to test 
whether this pattern of results is confirmed on a larger scale. If so, then one would need to 
explore where this comes from. The answer is indeed not obvious. As I reviewed in Section 
2.2, all cognitive manipulations have been criticized in one way or in another one, including 
neurostimulation, and there is no consensus among scholars about which cognitive 
manipulation works better than others. Therefore, the fact that neurostimulation seems to 
work differently from the other ones (at least in some behavioural domains) cannot be simply 
explained by saying that either neurostimulation or all the other cognitive manipulations are 
flawed. One possibility is that they measure different things. But, if so, what are they 
measuring? And, more importantly, is this simply a methodological problem or is red flag 
that the dual-process model is not a good description of people’s decision-making, at least in 
some contexts?  Answering these questions is a crucial direction for future research, which 
might lead to important methodological and theoretical advances.  
 
 
 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
I reviewed the existing literature on the cognitive basis of cooperation, altruism, honesty, 
resource distribution (equity vs efficiency), positive and negative reciprocity and their 
expectations, and moral judgments (deontology vs act utilitarianism). For each of these 
domains, I listed a number of open problems that I believe to be key to further advance our 
understanding of human social cognition. I concluded by making an attempt to introduce a 
theoretical framework to explain the main empirical regularities. The framework is 
promising, as it makes predictions that are generally in line with the empirical evidence, in all 
but one case: positive reciprocity. This framework too has several limitations. I hope that 
future work will shed light on the numerous areas in which empirical evidence is 
inconclusive and theoretical predictions are inaccurate. I did my best to keep the review self-
contained, exhaustive and research-oriented. My hope is that it can contribute to bring further 
attention in an area of research that has emerged in the last decades as one of the most vibrant 
and exciting areas of research in social science. 
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